dominant party of their state, who often run into issues when voting in primaries. Batchis notes that the Court consistently "treats party association as if it were purely voluntary. The result is disenfranchisement, a consequence that is in significant tension with the Supreme Court's right to vote jurisprudence" (p. 98). Typically, when the Supreme Court hears a case regarding one of the political parties, it judges it as if it were only the party organization, and ignores the other two thirds of what parties are: the electorate and elected officials. This singular view has greatly expanded the power and influence of party organizations while diminishing the power of the party in government, and especially the party in the electorate. In a particularly apt example, the author describes how voters in California voted to enact a blanket primary system that both the major political party organizations opposed. The Supreme Court, as the author notes, decided against the state officials and electorate, shielding the parties by again affirming their First Amendment rights.

Part III details the long and winding history of campaign finance regulations that, while enacted by voters and elected government officials, have time and again been overturned by the Supreme Court due to its doctrine of assuming the parties are entirely private entities with constitutional protections barring their regulation. The Court has so enshrined constitutional protections to political party organizations that "critics of the *Citizens United* decision who feel that its holding damaged the electoral process are often heard arguing for the highly unlikely remedy of amending the Constitution: The majoritarian option of ordinary legislation has been deemed irrelevant by judicial fiat" (p. 146).

Part IV uses ballot access and gerrymandering decisions to further demonstrate the issues involved in regulating political party organizations and offers a novel proposal to potentially fix the situation. In chapter 11 the author brings up an array of cases pertaining to access to official state ballots. In short, the political party organizations dominate these decisions and have in one way or another crafted most regulations regarding who can be on a ballot and what the requirements are. Regarding redistricting and gerrymandering, it is obvious to any observer that political party organizations have captured this constitutionally mandated procedure. In recent years, complaints of highly gerrymandered districts have not been of interest to the Supreme Court. In attempts to halt or slow down partisanship in redistricting, Batchis points out that multiple jurisdictions have created nonpartisan commissions with mixed success.

Part IV also offers a potential solution to party organizations having entrenched constitutional protections: parties as limited public forums. The author suggests that the previous choice to categorize political parties as expressive associations was a mistake, and that limited public forums are the best way forward. This designation "provides a better framework for constitutionalizing the political party system …. It would acknowledge the extent to which parties are inextricably integrated into the American system of representative government, while at the same time respecting the crucial traditional role they play in vigorously disseminating and facilitating free speech" (pp. 223–24). In other words, the constitutional middle ground proposed here would allow for restrictions to be placed on party activities like fundraising or discrimination, but leave be their ability to be forums where ideas can be exchanged freely.

The author drives the point home that political party organizations are unique and need a unique judicial solution. The connections Batchis makes between expansive growth in influence from political party organizations over time and Supreme Court jurisprudence is novel and extraordinarily well done. He fleshes out underdeveloped literature surrounding both the influence of the Supreme Court and how political party organizations have grasped control over most levers of government. Batchis has a straightforward solution for this issue that the party electorate and party in government appear to desperately want but cannot seem to get enacted: limits on party power. By using the idea of designating political parties as limited public forums, Batchis gives the Court a way out by allowing the free exchange of ideas to continue while also putting some safeguards in place to help preserve our democracy.

Any scholar of political parties or judicial politics should take the time to read the arguments in this important book. The author clearly and exhaustively explains how political parties have become as entrenched as they are today, expertly explains how the unclear and contradictory jurisprudence of the Supreme Court is squarely to blame, and offers the most likely way to set things right.

Experimental Thinking: A Primer on Social Science Experiments. By James Druckman. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2022. 228p. $99.99 cloth, $29.99 paper.
doi:10.1017/S1537592723000294

— Thad Dunning, *University of California, Berkeley*
thad.dunning@berkeley.edu

James Druckman begins his new book, *Experimental Thinking: A Primer on Social Science Experiments,* by underscoring a remarkable contrast between two presidential addresses given to the American Political Science Association. In 1909, A. Lawrence Lowell declared "we are limited by the impossibility of experiment. Politics is an observational, not an experimental, science." Yet by 2019 another APSA president, Rogers Smith, asked whether "an excessive emphasis on experiments will unduly constrict the questions political scientists ask." Clearly, the striking difference reflects the very rapid recent expansion, especially over the past two decades, of experimental political science.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592723000294 Published online by Cambridge University Press

One might expect a figure such as Druckman—a leading scholar who has contributed so fundamentally to the very growth he documents—to celebrate this experimental turn. In part, the book does emphasize the value of experimental research. Yet Druckman also issues many cautionary notes, not so much about the method per se as about the threats posed by the much greater ease today of conducting certain kinds of experiments. Computing advances allowing for large-scale randomization and data processing as well as new opportunities to collect data from social media, internet panels, or elites have sharply expanded both the domains and the scale of experimentation. Concurrently, a movement towards open science (encompassing pre-registration, replication, and other elements) has made reviewers more amenable to the publication of experiments reporting null effects. According to Druckman, these developments "bring with them new opportunities but also a new type of poverty … There is much less at stake with each experiment, given the relative ease of data collection and increasing acceptance of null results … In short, the concerns are … poor designs, inappropriate analyses, limited use of data, and/or flawed interpretations. Even an infinite amount of data cannot compensate for a thoughtlessly designed experiment" (p. 6). The ostensibly greater ease of implementation, Druckman argues, has sometimes disconnected experiments from the full scientific process. To put it another way, "a good experiment is slow moving … counter to the current fast-moving temptations available in the social sciences" (pp. 2-3). Less a textbook on technical aspects of experimental design in the social sciences (of which there are now many excellent examples, including some of Druckman's other volumes), this is a wide-ranging discussion of how to think about and interpret experiments properly.

Druckman emphasizes several key themes:

1) Experiments are properly only one part of a long scientific process, which involves defining research questions, deriving testable hypotheses, considering measurement validity, and connecting experimental design to theory (Chapter 2);
2) Concepts and measurement validity centrally determine the extent to which experiments can inform theory. However, mundane realism (or "the extent to which events occurring in the research setting are likely to occur in the normal course of subjects' lives", p. 52) is much less important than many critics often assert. Moreover, in thinking about external validity, many focus on the characteristics of experimental *units* in relation to some broader population, but experiments also "sample" contexts, treatments, and outcomes, with implications that are too rarely discussed (Chapter 3);
3) Some rapidly expanding types of experimental designs—for example, elite audit studies, conjoint survey experiments, and lab-in-the-field experiments—can leave substantial interpretive ambiguity (Chapter 4);
4) Replication is hard and sometimes not meaningful, because contexts, treatments, and outcomes often change in subtle ways, even if a plan for sampling experimental units themselves is replicated (Chapter 5). Most of the chapter sections end with helpful summaries that will be useful for teaching.

These are in my view excellent correctives—especially the core points that i) experiments are just one arrow in the social-scientific quiver; ii) that many questions are not amenable to experimentation; and iii) that considerations not centrally taught in many courses on experimental design, such as concept formation and measurement validity, are critical for successful and useful experimentation. Druckman leaves room not so much for quibbling as for alternatives to the powerful ideas he advances. Chapter 2, for example, offers a fairly expansive definition of experiments, contrasting "scientific" and "statistical" solutions to the fundamental problem of causal inference, i.e., the problem that one cannot observe outcomes simultaneously in the presence and absence of an intervention. I read Paul W. Holland's (1986) well-known discussion of this issue as also implying differences in the estimand of interest ("Statistics and Causal Inference," *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 81[1986]: 945-960). Temporal stability, causal transience, and possibly unit homogeneity are—in the social sciences, often very strong—assumptions that would allow for estimation of unit causal effects, under Druckman's scientific solution. The statistical solution provided by randomization (or its as-if version, in the case of natural experiments), by contrast, allows only for estimation of group effects.

Druckman reserves criticism that might be most controversial for the implications of open science. While he very plainly underscores the value of writing detailed descriptions of design and analytic procedures before conducting an experiment (i.e., a detailed pre-analysis plan), he also worries about several downsides. First, "inattention to careful data collection can lead to null results" and "overemphasis on pre-analysis plans shifts the basis of publication decisions toward the existence of a priori hypotheses and away from using statistical significance" (p. 136). Second, strict adherence to pre-analysis "assumes that any exploratory data analyses reflect post hoc theorizing, therefore requiring further data collection" (p. 138). And finally, "the process may stunt innovation since scholars become incentivized to only test well-developed hypotheses" (p. 140).

Each of these critiques has merit. Yet an ideal approach might also allow for a methodologically self-conscious

https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592723000294 Published online by Cambridge University Press

interplay between inductive development of theory and its testing. Consider the excellent article by Clayton et al. ("Women Grab Back: Exclusion, Policy Threat, and Women's Political Ambition" forthcoming, *American Political Science Review)*, who use focus groups with potential political candidates to generate a hypothesis that women's political exclusion motivates their political ambition when combined with a policy threat to women's interests. The paper thus uses theorization drawing from planned (and "exploratory") observation of the world and especially from the perceptions and theories of political actors themselves. However, the authors also and subsequently pre-specify and conduct an experimental test (one which is also reproduced—meaningfully, I think—in two different samples). The combination of clearly inductive but also a priori theorization and subsequent pre-specification of an experimental test eases some concerns that might otherwise arise, for example, from an ex-post stipulation of an interactive hypothesis. From this example, one might draw the conclusion that—just as experiments are only one part of a long scientific process—so is pre-registration.

Indeed, it might be possible to combine productively the best of both worlds. That is, we might integrate the slow work of designing excellent experiments with the somewhat faster work of, for instance, replication—even if as Druckman shows us the latter is often in fact properly thought of in terms of external validity and not "repetition."

Druckman's masterful discussion shows how even seemingly uncontroversial aspects of the faster work are anything but straightforward. His emphasis thus invites us to focus on when and how experimental design can in fact inform empirical assessment of theories. This tremendous book offers lessons of experience earned by one of the foremost practitioners of the experimental craft. It deserves to be very widely read.

Stealth Lobbying: Interest Group Influence and Health Care Reform. By Amy Melissa McKay. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2022. 230p. $99.99 cloth.
doi:10.1017/S1537592723000117

— James Strickland, *Arizona State University*
James.strickland@asu.edu

It is often said that the "devil is in the details," and perhaps no book better illustrates this idiom in American politics than Amy McKay's *Stealth Lobbying.* In this book, McKay argues that much of the influence achieved by lobbyists in Congress is hidden from public view and occurs at particularly pivotal moments during lawmaking processes. To McKay, "stealth lobbying" consists of "hidden requests for low-salience legislation" (p. 9). Using a variety of datasets that delve into the details of congresspersons' schedules and lobbyists' activities, McKay finds compelling evidence that stealth lobbying, particularly fundraising activities, affected the content of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010. By delving into the details of the act and uncovering previously undocumented means of influence, McKay suggests that previous searches for lobby influence in Congress were constrained by a lack of data and so were akin to searches for "lost keys in the light of [a] streetlamp" (p. 7); finding influence requires looking into the "dark" (p. 60). McKay shines a light on the details of Washington lawmaking and finds more than lost keys. She reveals a proverbial "devil": special-interest influence.

Three themes underlie McKay's examination of stealth lobbying. They help determine, in McKay's argument, why stealth lobbying is an effective yet generally unknown tactic in Congress. First, lobbyists achieve more influence when the public salience of an issue is low. The lack of salience provides reelection-seeking legislators the cover to work with lobbyists. Why would legislators work with lobbyists? The answer to this question is the second theme in McKay's argument: lobbyists achieve influence because they "make themselves useful" to lawmakers (p. 10). Lawmakers are said to be under immense pressure to fundraise for both their own and their colleagues' reelection efforts, and lobbyists facilitate the bundling of donations that do not need to be reported to the public (pp. 97–101). They also provide information to legislators. Although these two themes help explain the empirical findings presented throughout the book, McKay's third theme shows why previous studies looking for the influence of money in Congress yielded null findings for the most part. According to McKay, prior research struggled to find an effect of money on policy because of methodological limitations, intentional concealment of activities on the part of legislators, the prevalence of negative lobbying, and the "inverse pull" (p. 21) of access and influence; that is, lobbyists gain the most access to the least powerful legislators. In finding evidence for the effectiveness of stealth lobbying, McKay brings to light an unknown form of lobby influence.

Stealth Lobbying includes four chapters that present empirical findings. The first one examines the daily schedules of 11 members of Congress. Although these 11 members are not representative of the entire Congress, they vary in terms of the explanatory variables of most interest to McKay and include legislators (e.g., Max Baucus) who played prominent roles in reforming health care. The schedules were released voluntarily by the members. Regression analyses show that members granted more meetings to lobbyists who made donations or organized fundraising events and who were active on bills the member had sponsored. Interestingly, members with more prominent committee assignments granted access to lobbyists less often in general. McKay indicates that her analysis is the first to examine congresspersons' daily schedules.

Next, McKay turns to the political action committees (PACs) that lobbyists help direct. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act was developed during a time of

https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592723000294 Published online by Cambridge University Press