

Brokering Inclusion

Intermediaries, Clientelism, and Constraints on Latin America's Left Turn

Thad Dunning and Lucas M. Novaes

INTRODUCTION

The “inclusionary turn” in Latin America followed an unprecedented period of democratic stability in Latin America. Developments such as the end of the Cold War fostered an environment in which, despite some notable exceptions, neither popular mobilization nor the election of leftist governments sparked widespread authoritarian backlash. As Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar (this volume) suggest, stability created the conditions under which normal democratic practices could, in unequal societies, empower progressive and redistributive policies.

Yet, important social, economic, and political changes during the period of stabilization also transformed democratic practices in many countries in the region. The period beginning in the 1980s was marked in particular by the erosion of traditional linkages between left parties and unions (Collier and Handlin 2009a), political and fiscal decentralization (Montero and Samuels 2004; Falletti 2010; Goldfrank 2011), and changing modes of popular contestation.¹ Faced with growing economic informality, successful political parties adopted new modes of internal organization and electoral mobilization (Levitsky 2003a). Relative especially to the forms of mass politics in the aftermath of Latin America's labor-based incorporation (Collier and Collier 1991), these changes entailed fresh opportunities for – but also novel constraints on –

¹ On popular mobilization, see in this volume, *inter alia*, Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar; Boas; Etchemendy; Goldfrank; and Palmer-Rubin.

incorporation of popular sectors as durable members of left parties' electoral coalitions.

We suggest in this chapter that these transformations have important implications for the character and sustainability of the inclusionary turn in Latin America – in particular, because of the way they empowered autonomous local intermediaries whose support proved critical for the construction of left-party national power. The weakening of centralized unions and growth of horizontally organized associations gave local leaders of associations new capacities to impact the political behavior of group members (Palmer-Rubin, this volume).² Political and fiscal decentralization enhanced the ability of both subnational politicians and informal local patrons to influence their clients to support a particular party or candidate, thereby boosting those intermediaries' leverage in negotiations with national party elites. Such local leaders – whose followers may include members of popular sector associations, as well as more disaggregated networks of clients – often command loyal followings; in some settings, they can offer these networks of supporters to the highest bidder (Camp 2016; Novaes 2018). National left-party leaders have frequently required the support of these local intermediaries: often unable to win majorities through partisan or ideational linkages to citizens alone, national leaders have had to reach out to local authorities to mobilize difficult-to-reach voters. In this way, decentralization and informality provided local agents a new role as “brokers” – that is, political intermediaries who provide linkages between national leaders and mass publics (Stokes et al. 2013). As we show in this chapter, even externally mobilized left parties with clear programmatic agendas have, to a perhaps unappreciated degree, necessarily built coalitions through engagement with brokers.

Such alliances brought substantial electoral advantages for left- and labor-based parties: in the wake of economic changes and neoliberal policies, the actions of formal sector unions may no longer determine elections, yet reaching informal sectors is critical (Roberts 2002; Garay 2007). Given the empowerment of elected subnational politicians through political and fiscal decentralization, and the strengthening of informal local leaders through new forms of associational life, parties must reach down to decentralized nuclei of power to mobilize voters and implement public policy. Moreover, once left leaders gain power, they may face

² As discussed later, Collier and Handlin (2009b) describe this movement from what they call the “Union-Party Hub” to the “Association-Net.”

additional incentives to use their access to state resources to woo local brokers to expand their party's reach. To be sure, the construction of national power has long required negotiations with local elites, from *caudillos* or *coroneis* in postcolonial Latin America to powerful governors in democratic Brazil, Argentina, and elsewhere (Sarmiento 1845; Samuels 2003). Yet during the inclusionary turn, political and fiscal decentralization and transformations of associational structures heightened the importance of electoral alliances with local leaders.

However, these alliances also proved fragile. While some intermediaries are motivated ideologically by goals of social inclusion, or are tied to particular associations and have little opportunity to negotiate exit from specific partisan-movement linkages, many brokers have autonomous networks and some are opportunistic. Such intermediaries can change allegiances, and take supporters with them, if left parties cannot match the outside offers they receive from other parties. The terms of exchange between leaders and brokers are thus often, although not always, characterized by forms of clientelism – a quid pro quo exchange of benefits for political support (Stokes et al. 2013). The leaders of left parties in the region have relied on such negotiations to bolster their electoral support, secure national power, and implement policies. This broker-mediated strategy has proved a double-edged sword, however, because brokers are rarely perfect agents of the national parties with whom they contract (Stokes et al. 2013; Camp 2016; Larreguy et al. 2017). Coalitions constructed through such bargains can disappear, for instance, with shifts in incumbency or resource availability. The construction of electoral support through such alliances has other risks too. For example, the incorporation of opportunistic brokers can dilute the left party's "brand," in a manner described by Lupu (2013); and it may antagonize militants at the party's base. Thus, while the broker-mediated strategy carries benefits to national parties, it also entails potential costs. Left-party leaders recognize this dilemma, which is not unlike the general problem engendered by electoral socialism (Przeworski and Sprague 1988) or faced by any party seeking to expand its support beyond its core support base (Roemer 2006). Indeed, the dynamics of broker-mediated strategies that we describe in this chapter could apply equally well to parties of the right; we focus here on left parties in Latin America because of their importance in accelerating and shaping greater inclusion, as analyzed in this volume.

We argue that the prevalence of broker-mediated electoral strategies among left parties has important implications for the nature and

durability of the inclusionary turn. First, the instability inherent in many alliances with local brokers affects the durability of social policies: fragile coalitions and the programs they support can be undone when incumbent left parties lose office or access to resources (Mazzuca, this volume). Even where the election of left parties expanded access to new types of inclusionary social policy (Hunter, this volume; Garay, this volume), reliance on broker-mediated strategies for capturing national office carried implications for the policies' longer-term sustainability. Second and more subtly, left parties not only gain access to power but also exercise power (Mazzuca 2010) with the support of local intermediaries. While the increasing inclusion of popular sectors has been facilitated, as Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar (this volume) suggest, by the "Left turn" in Latin America, the nature of broker-mediated distribution may place constraints on inclusionary policies – including those that would offer greater material resources to popular sectors. Reliance on brokers can also accentuate corruption and rent seeking. In sum, the broker-mediated nature of the Left turn in many Latin American countries has shaped the character, extent, and likely sustainability of the turn toward inclusion (see also Pop-Eleches, this volume).

We thus suggest that negotiations with local brokers played a critical role in shaping the consolidation of left parties – and thus the nature of the inclusionary turn – across Latin America. In cases from Peronism in Argentina (Auyero 2001) and Chavismo in Venezuela (Dunning 2008; Stokes et al. 2013) to the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in Mexico (Larreguy et al. 2016), left or populist parties seeking to build electoral support in the popular sectors relied on alliances with such local intermediaries. To be sure, "broker-mediated" forms of democratic practice have not been uniform throughout the region; nor have they everywhere shaped the ways in which parties of the Left engage and mobilize popular sectors. In Chile, parties including those of the center-left coalition have arguably relied to a greater extent on personalized electoral campaigns and media-based appeals (Boas 2016), notwithstanding some evidence of clientelist strategies on the part of the conservative Unión Demócrata Independiente (Luna 2010). In Uruguay, left-party–union linkages have been more persistent (Etchemendy, this volume), while in Bolivia, the left party Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) relied on organic ties to social movement organizations to generate new, enduring forms of partisan identity (Poertner 2018). Yet, electoral alliances with opportunistic local brokers have played an important role, even in cases where this outcome might seem most unexpected.

In this chapter, we examine such a “least-likely” case for the broker-mediated construction of national power: the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores – PT) in Brazil. The PT has been characterized by scholars as an ideological party, one that was both externally mobilized – meaning that key aspects of internal party organization crystallized while the party was out of power (Panbianco 1988; Shefter 1994) – and that pursued clear programmatic goals in office. Of all left parties in contemporary Latin America, the PT arguably has had the most coherent internal organization (Van Dyck 2014a; Van Dyck and Montero 2015), with solid connections to committed activists, base organizations, and organized labor. While party switching may be generally easier for brokers in Brazil than in some other Latin American cases – due inter alia to the weakness of parties and the volatility of the party system – the PT itself presents a case in which we might expect less reliance on opportunistic brokers, in favor of programmatic ideology and organizational coherence. Before and especially after winning important legislative and executive offices, however, the PT faced a problem: it required broadening the geographical reach of its electoral support to cement national power. We show that one important way in which the PT accomplished its expansion was through tactical alliances with local brokers, recruiting intermediaries especially in the country’s North and Northeastern regions who (unlike party activists) tended to be both autonomous and opportunistic. While this strategy reaped substantial rewards for the PT as it constructed its project of national power, it also carried important costs. In particular, we use new data to show that when the party’s approval plummeted during and after the presidency of Dilma Rousseff, and the PT’s access to state and private resources dried up, many such brokers acted instrumentally and left the party. Although the jury is still out, the fragility of the PT’s expansionary strategy may inhibit the sustainability of a range of inclusionary policies, promoted by the PT during its golden age, that fostered greater recognition, access, and resources for the popular sectors (Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar, this volume).

Our argument and findings make contributions both to the specific study of the PT’s rise in Brazil, and to the general understanding of the role of brokers in Latin America’s inclusionary turn. For Brazil, they gainsay a prevailing notion about the PT’s trajectory in power, and particularly the causes of its electoral success in the country’s North and Northeast. In one set of accounts, the party replaced and supplanted traditional clientelistic machines in the Northeast with stable popular organizations at the grassroots (Montero 2012; Van Dyck and Montero

2015). Other scholars have instead emphasized the importance of the expansion of social policies such as conditional cash transfer programs (CCTs), particularly *Bolsa Família* (Zucco and Power 2013) or pointed to the importance of Lula's popularity in the region. While we would not deny the potential longer-term political implications of such changes – indeed, returns in the presidential elections in 2018 suggest enduring successes for the PT in the Northeast – many arguments understate the importance of alliances with municipal power brokers and especially do not explore the longer-term implications of the broker-mediated construction of power. We thus add here to the emphasis of scholars such as Alves and Hunter (2017) and Alves (2018) on the PT's pragmatic alliances in the Northeast. Yet, we further explore the ways in which the party's expansion led the PT to field mayoral candidates that were very different from the traditional *petista* (PT adherent); and we also show that after the impeachment of a PT president, these nontraditional allies proved very disloyal and rapidly left the party. The party's embrace of heterogeneous coalition members may have tainted the party's brand and facilitated a rapid return of old bosses and machine parties as the PT lost ground nationally.

More generally, we contribute to the literature on party adaptation, focusing on the challenges faced by parties that seek to move outside their traditional programmatic bases. Yet, we focus specifically on the relationship between party elites at higher tiers of government and the autonomous, sometimes opportunistic intermediaries with whom they often must strike alliances. While the autonomy and leverage of local brokers has varied across Latin American party systems, we argue that any general account of how left parties acted when in power during the period of the inclusionary turn must take the relationship of parties with such brokers into account.

In the rest of the chapter, we first develop a conceptualization of brokers that builds on recent scholarship (Stokes et al. 2013; Holland and Palmer-Rubin 2015) but that emphasizes especially the conditions under which brokers become both relatively autonomous of national leadership, as well as opportunistic. This allows consideration of the conditions under which near-universal developments in Latin America in the last decades of the twentieth century – such as economic transformation and political decentralization – did the most to increase the importance and leverage of local brokers. We then turn to our analysis of the Brazilian case, leveraging new data on the social and political backgrounds of brokers recruited by the Workers' Party to show the ways in

which the expansion of the PT in North and Northeastern regions of the country altered the character of the party's organization. The party's strategy allowed temporary electoral successes that gave it a stronger hold on national power. However, the strategy may have shaped not only the exercise of power and the character of policy during the inclusionary turn; it also proved electorally fragile, as opportunistic brokers abandoned the party as the PT faced scandal and voter discontent. In the Conclusion, we discuss the strategic alternatives to broker-mediated incorporation that have existed for left parties and examine why some parties must negotiate with autonomous brokers while others do not. Finally, we further consider implications for the character and sustainability of novel social policies amidst signs that the inclusionary turn has begun to wane in Brazil and several other countries of the region.

INFORMALITY, DECENTRALIZATION, AND DEMOCRATIC PRACTICE IN LATIN AMERICA

The decline of import substitution industrialization (ISI) in the 1980s, economic crises, and the rise of austerity programs substantially eroded the base of formal sector economic organizations that had provided the backbone of what Collier and Handlin (2009a), building on Collier and Collier (1991), call the "Union-Party Hub." That earlier period of popular sector incorporation was characterized by the "central, privileged, and dominant role of unions as organizations of interest intermediation." In that context, unions were "affiliated to and constituted the core support base of different forms of labor-based parties" (Collier and Handlin 2009a, 5). Thus, during the period of the Union-Party Hub, organizational linkages to the formal, organized working class were critical for left parties (Collier and Collier 1991).

However, the waning in size and importance of the formal sector, and the commensurate increase in economic informality, created a new calculus for left parties (Roberts 2002; Garay 2007).³ In place of unions, various kinds of associations played an increasingly prominent role as the "base units" of what Collier and Handlin (2009a) term the "Association-Net." This implied a reduction in the importance of party links to unions, whose support was arguably no longer determinant of left-party electoral success; and an increasing importance of mobilization

³ See Feierherd (2017) for an argument that the election of left parties has actually fostered economic informality.

of horizontally organized networks of potential supporters. Thus, relationships of parties and candidates to the leaders of, for example, participatory organizations, neighborhood associations, women's groups, religious groups, or rural communities have played an important role in electoral campaigns. Informal leaders and neighborhood problem-solvers with strong social ties, such as *punteros* in Argentina, have also become increasingly important forces for political mobilization (Levitsky 2003b).

Roughly concurrently, a major impulse toward political and fiscal decentralization also transformed the political arena in Latin America (Falleti 2010; Goldfrank 2011). Throughout the period that gave rise to the "inclusionary turn" studied in this volume, elected officials in subnational units such as provinces and municipalities played an ever more important role. From 1980 to 1995, for example, the number of countries in the region allowing the direct election of mayors increased from three to seventeen (Montero and Samuels 2004). Subnational political competition empowered local elected officials to cultivate supporters, sometimes independently of national party organizations. National party leaders increasingly found themselves negotiating with such local officials for support, particularly in unstable party systems, in which local leaders could easily shift alliances from one party to another. Fiscal decentralization in some countries may also have clearly enhanced the power of elected mayors and governors, as well as their leverage with respect to national politicians (Eaton 2011).

While it is difficult to identify the relative causal weight of increased economic informality, weakening party–union linkages, and political and fiscal decentralization, these economic and political changes together implied major transformations in democratic practice in Latin America. Elected subnational officials, associational leaders, and various informal organizers became increasingly important figures in electoral mobilization. Notwithstanding differences in the structures of their networks or their types of positions, such leaders became "brokers" who could influence group members to move voters toward a particular party or candidate; and that leverage has provided political capital that brokers could exploit to their advantage. Such intermediaries can sometimes be patrons of various kinds of clientelistic networks, meaning that they mobilize support from their followers via *quid pro quo* exchanges of resources for political support (Stokes et al. 2013; Holland and Palmer-Rubin 2015). However, clientelism in the relationship between intermediaries and voters is not necessary for the political importance of transactions between intermediaries and left-party leaders: what is required is simply

that brokers be able to influence or command the vote of citizens in their networks, whether that is through clientelistic or non-clientelistic means. In short, the rise of such brokers often made it impossible for parties to mobilize voters successfully and to implement public policy without reaching down to decentralized nuclei of power, each with its own political networks and respective local leaders.

Before developing this argument further, it is useful to specify the common features of such intermediaries. We conceptualize “brokers” in terms of the political *role* that they play in connecting national leaders to mass publics, especially voters in the popular sectors, rather than in terms of their specific office. Thus, the key feature of brokers, as opposed to other kinds of intermediaries, is that they use their connections and influence over voters in their jurisdictions to mobilize electoral support on behalf of political parties or candidates, usually at higher levels of government.⁴ This focus on the functional role of brokers rather than their specific position echoes, for example, Scott’s discussion of terms such as patron and client, which designate “roles and not persons, and thus it is quite possible for a single individual to act both as a broker and a patron” (Scott 1972, 96; see also Scott 1969). While brokers may sometimes be elected governors, state legislators, mayors, and city council members, such elected officials also play other roles; they may not only or always act as brokers between national parties and voters. In addition, not all brokers are elected subnational officials. Thus, when associational leaders or informal intermediaries such as *punteros* in Argentina place themselves between political parties and voters, they assume the role of brokers.

To be sure, not all networks or leaders are equal for purposes of electoral mobilization (Mares and Young 2016; Larreguy et al. 2017). And intermediaries can play an important role in many different systems of interest intermediation. Indeed, brokers – as we conceptualize them here – certainly played critical roles during the period of the Union–Party Hub. What, then, is distinctive about brokers in several Latin American countries during the period of the inclusionary turn?

The answer plausibly lies in the conditions that have tended to make brokers both quite autonomous of national leadership, as well as opportunistic. Thus, relative to the period of the Union–Party Hub, political decentralization has frequently allowed officials and candidates to

⁴ Bussell (2018) usefully distinguishes brokers from other sorts of intermediaries, such as middlemen or “fixers,” along these lines.

cultivate independent bases of political support. The horizontal organization of networks in the Association-Net, and in the informal economic sector more generally, has also facilitated autonomous local leadership. Moreover, and perhaps in part as a function of the demise of the Union-Party Hub, many brokers appeared substantially less motivated by programmatic or ideological goals – though distinguishing between program-oriented and opportunistic brokers remains important, as we do in our empirical analysis.

Specifically, brokers can be characterized by the degree to which they are wedded to particular parties or instead are potentially autonomous. This conception to some extent straddles the typology proposed by Holland and Palmer-Rubin (2015), who distinguish between what they call independent, party, organizational, and hybrid brokers, according to whether such intermediaries are embedded in an organization (e.g. in the case of organizational or hybrid brokers) and whether they mobilize voters for single or multiple parties (e.g. in the case of party vs. independent brokers, respectively). As Holland and Palmer-Rubin describe, organizational brokers may “represent the collective interests of voters in interest associations and renegotiate ties to political parties between election cycles ... Leaders negotiate a price that they will be paid to persuade their members to support the party at the polls or at campaign rallies” (2015, 1187). Yet, there are also ideologically motivated leaders of associations who, especially in party systems with only one party with whom brokers can plausibly form ties, are necessarily linked to that particular party.⁵ By the same token, party brokers may or may not be tied to a single machine party, as Holland and Palmer-Rubin (2015) or Stokes et al. (2013) describe. To the extent that brokers can credibly threaten to leave one party and offer their voters’ support to another party or candidate, they gain leverage in bargaining with party leaders (Camp 2016). Many elected subnational officials can switch parties, meaning they can potentially mobilize voters for multiple parties and therefore can “shop” for the best offer from party leaders. Yet, these are not “independent” brokers as conceptualized by Holland and Palmer-Rubin (2015), because they mobilize on behalf of specific parties with which they are allied, at least for a given electoral cycle. Thus, the degree of autonomy and the exit options available to brokers are variable.

⁵ Holland and Palmer-Rubin (2015) call this type a “hybrid broker.”

Brokers may also vary according to their opportunism, as opposed to the extent to which they are ideologically committed or motivated by a programmatic platform. Ideological commitment is subtly different from the extent of autonomy. Holland and Palmer-Rubin (2015, 1195) posit that “When a broker cares about a party’s electoral fate for ideological or instrumental reasons, then it may make sense to think of brokers as agents of political parties.” It is possible, however, that brokers have ideological but not partisan preferences; the extent to which they end up serving as agents of a party (and thus diminishing their autonomy) depends *inter alia* on the nature of the party system (e.g. whether there is only one party or instead several parties that intersect with their ideological preferences).

Our central contention, then, is that economic changes such as growing informality, and political changes such as increasing decentralization, contributed to making autonomous, opportunistic brokers more powerful and more prevalent, including in the organizational machinery of left parties. Labor-based parties have faced a trade-off in recruiting brokers. Ideologically motivated brokers with limited autonomy – call these “program-oriented brokers” – are less likely to change parties and possibly cheaper to motivate. If the broker is specific and can only operate under a single banner, or it has only access to clients through party–organization linkages (e.g. through unions), then the broker has very little mobility (Camp 2016). In left parties, these are often class-based brokers, which may be inserted in mass organizations, like unions; but may also appear in smaller, grassroots organizations and associations. Yet, such brokers can be costly to produce, as organizing and training them is costly, and they may have limited reach; especially in times of union decline, if a party wants to appeal to a diverse, heterogeneous group of voters, program-based brokers can become ineffective. Autonomous brokers, by contrast, can incorporate diverse groups of voters. They are also readily recruitable, particularly if they are opportunistic, as long as left parties have resources with which to hire them. However, autonomous and opportunistic brokers are also unreliable in the long term; and if they have “detachable” clienteles, meaning that their voters’ support can potentially be transferred between candidates or parties, they may be ready and willing to sell that support in exchange for the most attractive offer they receive.

It is therefore useful to underscore both the opportunities and limitations of “broker-mediated” strategies through which left parties accessed and exercised power in Latin America. Those parties that were able to adapt to economic and political changes through the construction of

informal, often clientelist, alliances survived (Levitsky 2003a). Yet, for left parties with programmatic orientations toward greater inclusion – such as Brazil’s Workers’ Party, to be considered below – the importance of broker-mediated electoral mobilization created strategic dilemmas, especially as those parties began to win national elections. Without access to state resources, such left parties had often relied only on external, class-based party organizations for voter mobilization, mostly located in large metropolitan areas (Panebianco 1988; Shefter 1994). Once they were in government, however, that was no longer the case: the Left turn implied that left parties gained access to state resources. This created an opportunity: successful left parties could use state resources to embrace clientelistic networks and rapidly expand their reach. This appeared attractive relative to other strategies – such as encouraging other types of local networks to help the party or building new ones from the ground up – since waiting for new mobilization schemes to mature can take substantial time. Yet, while a broker-based strategy can provide rapid returns, clientelistic connections to local leaders are unstable: patrons have autonomous networks and can change allegiances if the left party can no longer counter outside offers these patrons might receive from other parties.

To be sure, the power and extent of autonomous, opportunistic brokers has varied across Latin America’s party systems – as has their role in left parties during the inclusionary turn. For instance, the ability of Argentine brokers to work for various factions within the overall Peronist label has plausibly given brokers substantial autonomy, as well as leverage vis-à-vis party higher-ups (Stokes et al. 2013; Camp 2016). By contrast PRI brokers in Mexico, whose outside options appear to be more limited (Larreguy et al. 2017; Palmer-Rubin, this volume) have substantially less autonomy. In Chávez’s Venezuela, brokers working with the national incumbent included a substantial contingent of ideologically committed activists whose defection to the political opposition appeared unlikely; yet even there, opposition mayors recruited disaffected Chavista brokers, for instance, in the opposition-controlled municipality of Sucre (Stokes et al. 2013, 107). In other contexts, such as Bolivia, the left party’s organic ties to social movements, and the lack of credible partisan exit options for brokers on the Left, may have engendered substantially less autonomy and opportunism. In general, such variation across contexts may surely affect the character of contracts between left parties and local brokers, as well as their centrality to any effort to construct national power.

Among the parties that came to power during Latin America's "Left turn," nonetheless, the Workers' Party in Brazil has been seen as among the least reliant on broker-mediated clientelism. As we detail next, this makes it an especially instructive case for closer examination – since any broker-mediated dynamics we find there may apply even more strongly elsewhere.

THE PT AS A LEAST-LIKELY CASE

Over recent decades, the Workers' Party (PT) transformed itself to become the most powerful party in Brazil, winning the presidency four times in a row, and becoming the largest party in the Brazilian Congress. Although it had been the party with the strongest organization beginning in the 1980s, its electoral base was then too small to capture the presidency. A top-down expansion plan we describe in this section would change that. While in government, the PT became the driver of unprecedented social change in Brazil. However, especially in the wake of the impeachment of its sitting president in 2016 and the election of right-wing populist Jair Bolsonaro in 2018, what is now clear is the organizational crisis the party faces. We suggest that the case of the PT may provide a cautionary tale about the dangers left parties face when moving toward the political center and embracing established interests; and how the compromises such parties may choose to make can not only undermine their integrity as political organizations, but also make their inclusionary accomplishments fragile. In particular, with respect to the themes of this chapter, it provides an important lesson in both the benefits and the costs of broker-mediated strategies for constructing national power.

As it rose to power, the PT had a solid organization, with external linkages to mass groups, internal discipline, and a clear programmatic agenda (Keck 1995; Hunter 2010; Samuels and Zucco 2016). This made it a rare case of successful externally mobilized party building in Brazil and in contemporary Latin America (Levitsky et al. 2016) – and plausibly a least-likely case for the alliances with autonomous, opportunistic brokers that we describe in this chapter.⁶ In the early 1980s, when Brazil was transitioning from a military regime and experiencing widening inequality caused by exclusionary economic policies and high inflation (Weyland 1996, 11), unions started to mobilize, promoting

⁶ Levitsky et al. (2016) cite only two successful cases of externally mobilized parties in Latin America: the PT and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) in Mexico.

nationwide strikes. In that context, the labor movement gave rise to the PT. Unlike other political organizations in Brazil, the party constructed organic ties to unions and promoted vibrant grassroots movements, while also winning the support of several liberal, middle-class sectors (Van Dyck 2014b, 67). These unprecedented features would allow the PT to sustain a leftist policy platform while being a competitive contender in the country's urban centers. At that point, the party had no access to state resources or connections to large private donors. Much of the party's financing instead depended on its internal structure of voluntary contributions from members, from state bureaucrats with party membership, and elected politicians (Mainwaring 1999). The party also innovated by picking intellectuals, union leaders, blue-collar and rural workers, bureaucrats, and public school teachers, as well as members from ecclesiastical communities set up by progressive Catholic priests (Keck 1995; Meneguello 1989), as activists, brokers, and candidates.

Initial successes in legislative and executive elections, however, revealed an important challenge for the PT: the party needed to broaden its electoral support to attain and strengthen its hold on national power. In particular, the party lacked a substantial presence in large portions of the Brazilian territory, such as the North and Northeastern regions. Although the party accumulated electoral successes in contexts where its allied groups were numerous and mobilized, such as large industrial metropolitan areas, its support among voters was not wide enough nationally to win the presidency. To be sure, as the party evolved, various organized groups also increased in numbers, including landless rural workers and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) communities; and they often allied with the PT and enlarged its base. The party leadership realized that to capture and retain the national executive, however, it would have to moderate part of its economic agenda, thereby mending its relations with the business sector and financial elites.

Perhaps even more importantly, the party would have to partner with practitioners of traditional forms of Brazilian party politics and embrace some of their practices (Hunter 2010, 2). In particular, it would need to expand to areas where patrimonial politics still dominated. To broaden its support in the Brazilian North and Northeast, for example, the PT would need to ally with subnational authorities, including not just governors and state deputies but also mayors, who can influence the vote share of higher officials through their local mobilizational efforts (Novaes 2018). Reflecting Brazil's decentralized, federal context, these authorities

had substantial authority and prestige (Samuels 2003). In addition, their importance as influential intermediaries to voters was augmented both by the PT's insufficient connections to unionized workers in the North and Northeast and especially the relatively small size of the formal sector as a whole (Barbosa Filho and Moura 2015). Not only did unionized workers never surpass 16 percent of the total labor force of the Northern region and 20 percent in the Northeast, these workers were increasingly registered in unions belonging to federations with no partisan attachment to the PT (Rodrigues et al. 2016). Together with political decentralization, the prevalence of economic informality – involving groups of workers that are often small in comparison to unions – empowers sub-national politicians who are proximate to citizens. These structural ingredients gave local authorities the necessary tools and resources to mobilize voters who lacked firm partisan commitments and therefore made the recruitment of numerous autonomous and often opportunistic political intermediaries a critical ingredient in the PT's success as it constructed a larger national coalition. To be sure, as an externally mobilized party whose support often came from small nuclei of grassroots movements, the PT had always depended on intermediaries; yet, before the party's political moderation at the end of the 1990s (Hunter 2010), these agents were in large part recruited from within the party organization and were ideologically committed to the party's programmatic goals. Moreover, since this strong organization made the PT exceptional in Brazil, these brokers had few reasons to relinquish access to the party's strong connections to popular sectors, or risk alienating themselves from the PT's supporters, by switching parties. While such activists indeed largely proved loyal to the PT, the new brokers with whom the PT struck alliances during its phase of national growth tended to be autonomous and opportunistic.

The strategy of alliances with such brokers therefore entailed risks that were understood within the party's national leadership and were actively debated within the party (Ribeiro 2014). Yet, they were weighed against the benefits of national expansion. As former president Lula put it to one of the authors in a personal interview,

The policy of alliances was the subject of much debate in the PT, because various party members argued that we should under no circumstances ally ourselves with some of our traditional adversaries in certain states and municipalities. I always understood their rationale. However, one needs to understand that we didn't invent the system of politics that exists in Brazil . . . After three presidential terms in power, I think that the idea was entrenched in the PT that in executive elections

we needed to expand our range of support and bring to our proposals representatives of different social groups.⁷

In the rest of this section, we document the way in which the PT's expansion indeed altered the background of its brokers; relied on party switching by intermediaries and alliances with traditional adversaries, in the context of large electoral coalitions; yet ultimately proved fragile during the more recent period of the party's crisis. We then turn to implications for the character and durability of the inclusionary turn in Brazil.

The PT and Its Brokers

Initial electoral successes gave the party a larger repertoire for party building, including an advantage common to any incumbent: access to state resources. After Lula's election to the presidency in 2002, PT leaders had a clear plan of territorial expansion (Hunter 2010; Van Dyck and Montero 2015). In particular, the party deliberately courted allies in those regions of the country where in the past the party had never built a large support base, especially the North and Northeast. Timing was a key concern for the PT, since the Brazilian federal system requires a wide coalition of allies in Congress and at subnational levels (Abranches 1988; Pereira et al. 2008; Gómez Bruera 2015). Expansion strategies requiring time to mature could lead to a dysfunctional government. Without an aggressive policy to reach out to subnational and local allies, the PT's success in obtaining the presidency would not spill over to its congressional candidates; deputies' electoral successes would depend on local brokers including mayors, who in turn would depend on state resources to mobilize votes (Novaes 2018). Moreover, the *petista* government would not be able to build and sustain support in Congress without distributing pork to deputies of other parties, since these politicians rely on patronage for political survival (Pereira and Mueller 2004). Not surprisingly, according to analyses of the process of party building before

⁷ Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, email interview with Lucas Novaes, February 2013. In Portuguese, “[P]olítica de alianças era um ponto de muito debate no PT, pois vários companheiros defendiam que não poderíamos em nenhuma conjuntura nos aliar com alguns dos nossos tradicionais adversários em alguns estados e municípios. Eu sempre compreendi esse raciocínio. Entretanto, é preciso entender que não fomos nós que inventamos o sistema político que existe no Brasil... Depois de três mandatos presidenciais acho que o PT consolidou a ideia de que nas eleições para cargos executivos é preciso ampliar o leque de apoios e trazer para nossas propostas diferentes representantes de grupos sociais.”

and after Lula's win in 2002, the expansion to the poorest regions of the country (the North and Northeast) was encompassing and swift (Ribeiro 2014; Van Dyck 2014a). With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the goal of establishing itself as the leading party in the country was accomplished not only by winning and retaining the presidency after 2002 but also by consolidating a pro-government coalition in Congress.

This expansion of the party's frontiers after Lula's electoral success was fundamentally different from the process of party formation during the 1980s (Ribeiro 2014, 123; Van Dyck and Montero 2015). The conditions the party faced in the target territories were also very dissimilar. Unlike those areas where the party had organized and collected victories in its first decade, the areas where the PT's organization was still incipient differed in structural economic terms, and in the nature of class relations. If the party's initial mode of organization during the 1980s depended on a dense civil society in the industrialized South and Southeast, the PT ventured into the "new frontier" during a period of declining unionization and increasing informality – and faced population centers where organized labor had never flourished in any case due to weak industrialization. The party, therefore, would either have to induce new societal groups to organize or rely on local actors with proven electoral promise who might be eager to ally with the party commanding the national executive's resources. Especially given the importance of rapid expansion, the PT chose the latter strategy as its best course of action, at least in the short run. To be sure, the PT's old tactic of fomenting bottom-up social organizations and NGOs, mobilizing activists, and recruiting leaders from these organizations, when employed, remained successful in creating partisan ties (Samuels and Zucco 2015). Yet, the conditions to pursue this alternative were not everywhere available. In the North and Northeast, especially in a period of increasing economic informality and deepening democratic decentralization, it became critical to build relations with local intermediaries.

Access to resources allowed the party to incorporate different kinds of supporters than in the past: the PT's new allies were a far cry from the party's traditional support base. In particular, rapidly expanding the party organization altered its configuration by adding many non-working-class members to it.⁸ Hence, it is useful to characterize the

⁸ The organization requirements for these new PT outposts also diverged from those of the past. As Ribeiro argues, there was a "weakening of the PT's societal links, primarily as a result of the collapse of the party's base units (*núcleos de base*), one of the main linkages between party and society and an essential mechanism in the processes of legalization and

expansion of the PT in the North and Northeast, where clientelistic practices have dominated the political process, in terms of the background of brokers with whom the party allied. Thus, rather than examining the number of local outposts the PT established during its expansionary wave, here we analyze the type of brokers the party relied upon in that effort. To be sure, empirically examining the economic class or the societal group from which local candidates hail, and upon which they exert influence, is difficult; and although the literature on the PT is extensive, it still lacks a nuanced analysis of regional differences in party building (Do Amaral and Power 2016, 152). To assess the intermediaries the PT relied upon during its expansion, and how different these brokers were from those of the past, we ideally would be able to classify old and new recruits according to the type of group, class, or sector they influence or represent.

To simplify this complex task, we first assume mayoral candidates in Brazil have influence over an electorate and may function as party broker – that is, they work as intermediaries for national and subnational party candidates. While conceptually brokers should be defined by their function, as we noted above, in Brazil we proxy brokers by their position. This apparent tension in our analysis simply reflects the body of evidence that Brazilian mayors very often do in fact play the role of brokers, that is, political intermediaries who provide linkages between higher-level politicians and voters (Novaes 2015, 2018). This function of mayors is likely similar in some Latin American cases (such as Argentina, as documented by Levitsky [2003a] or Stokes et al. [2013]) but not others (say, Chile or Uruguay). We then classify each mayoral candidate in Brazil according to their own previous professional activity. This is possible because when completing their candidacy applications, candidates must state their occupations.⁹ We separate local candidates into two different groups: those in occupations linked to the original *petista* base, specifically blue-collar workers, rural workers, bureaucrats, and teachers; and those belonging to other professional categories, such as people who work in retail, own a shop or factory, or are lawyers or physicians. With this approach, we can

establishment of the PT as an organization in the early years.... The 2001 party statute ... opened [local groups] as it opened them up to nonmembers and created competing forms of rank-and-file organization (with no internal representation), set up to provide temporary support around specific issues.... The grassroots work of the PT's leaders had become centered instead on the local branches, focused on electoral activities" (Ribeiro 2014, 101).

⁹ All data are available at the Supreme Electoral Court (TSE) website.




FIGURE 7.1 Shifting the base: working-class candidates in mayoral elections

pin down in an admittedly blunt way whether a particular local candidate is connected to a traditional labor-based area of activity or not. We also stratify brokers by party affiliation. Thus, this approach allows us to assess the occupational profile of the PT’s base of brokers, both in the North/Northeast region and elsewhere.

Figure 7.1 shows that after 2002, when Lula was elected president, the PT gradually enlisted brokers from outside its traditional base.¹⁰ Especially in expanding to the North and Northeast region, the party invested in nontraditional brokers. Thus, before winning the presidency in 2002, the PT was very distinct from other parties in the North and Northeast, having more than 40 percent of candidates coming from its traditional base, while others had less than half of that amount. During the following sixteen years, that distance from other parties declined rapidly. The trend in other regions is analogous, just less precipitous.

The PT not only relied on different types of brokers for its expansion to new territory; it also recruited local representatives with diverse political pasts. Figure 7.2 shows that before joining the PT, as much as 30 percent of the party’s most recent mayoral candidates in the North and Northeast

¹⁰ This shift away from the working-class support base has also been documented for participation in party conventions. As Ribeiro (2014) demonstrates, over time, the number of white-collar delegates increased while the number of blue-collar participants decreased.




FIGURE 7.2 Hiring outside help: proportion of PT mayoral candidates who were once in a different party

regions had in the past been a member of another party. Some of these brokers had started their careers in parties whose roots trace back directly to the country's authoritarian past, and whose electoral practices are markedly clientelistic. One notable case is that of Raul Filho, who won the 2004 and the 2008 mayoral elections as a PT candidate in Palmas, the capital of the Northern state of Tocantins. His trajectory as a politician is not that of a typical working-class, rank-and-file *petista*. The son of a powerful local politician, Filho had already been elected mayor of Palmas in 1996, but at that time he ran under the banner of PT's main rival in presidential elections, the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB). The PSDB, however, was only one of four other parties Filho had been a member of before joining the PT. Actually, his career started in the now-defunct Democratic Social Party (PDS), the continuation of the party that backed the military during the 1964–1985 dictatorship (ARENA). Filho was expelled from the PT in 2011 because he helped national deputies from rival parties get elected. The following year he faced corruption charges and was found guilty of environmental crimes. Although his sentence currently prevents him from running in elections, he is still an active politician, only now with the right-leaning Republican Party (PR).

This trajectory of coming from the traditional political elite is no longer unusual for PT candidates. In 2012, around 80 percent of candidates had previously been a member of a different party that originated from a centrist or right-wing party. Overall, almost a quarter of all PT candidates in that year had a center or right-wing party on their curriculum vitae.

Aside from directly seeking help from local notables by recruiting them to join the party, the PT also approached influential intermediaries to join forces in local electoral coalitions. Electoral coalitions are an important organizing device in the fragmented Brazilian party system, since they allow dozens of parties to coordinate around a few candidates running in first-past-the-post elections – as in mayoral races, where Duverger’s Law appears to be in effect (Fujiwara 2011). In the context of local elections, coalitions gathered different local power brokers at the same table. Electoral coalitions, however, present a trade-off for programmatic parties. In partnering with long-standing local leadership, the PT sometimes allied with traditional, clientelistic elites whose power emanates from privileges granted during the dictatorship, if not before (Hagopian 2007). Voters’ partisan identification may weaken when parties invite others to join their electoral coalition, especially when allies’ brands diverge (Lupu 2013). By inviting many parties to join in coalitions to support mayoral candidates, the PT conceivably damaged its brand.

As Figure 7.3 demonstrates, the PT has embraced other parties in its mayoral bids without much restraint. Here, we measure coalition size of *petistas* and other parties by averaging the absolute number of parties in each mayoral candidate ticket. As the figure shows, the size of coalitions in Brazil has been rising steadily over the years. This can be attributed to the continued and even increasing fragmentation of the Brazilian party system, which in 2016 consisted of more than thirty parties. During the 2000–2016 period, the PT followed an even sharper upward trend in coalition size, but eventually closed the distance to the rest of the parties in the party system. The trend was broken in the 2016 elections in regions outside the North and Northeast; yet the average coalition size continued to increase on the party’s “new frontier,” where in 2016 there is no noticeable difference between the PT and other parties in terms of coalition size.

The End of the Golden Age?

This strategy of recruiting autonomous and opportunistic brokers to join or ally with the party brought substantial initial rewards, as the PT gained




FIGURE 7.3 Lying with many bedfellows: coalition size in mayoral elections

the broad national support it needed to continue to win the national executive and to control the Brazilian Congress. However, the party's reliance on nonideological brokers outside of its traditional base, and the potential brand dilution stemming from large coalitions, spelled trouble when the party was driven out of the national executive. The party's clear programmatic identity was crucial to the party's survival when resources were scarce. Access to resources during its time in power, and their use in a broker-mediated expansionary strategy, may have damaged this prized party capital. How the increase in alliances with other parties affected its voters' party identification is beyond the scope of this chapter; however, despite the PT's growing support base during the golden years, there is little evidence that its new voters, especially in the Northeast, were actual partisans (Zucco 2008). In sum, the choice of relying on nontraditional brokers and embracing other political parties without much restraint could have harmed the PT's comparative advantages in terms of having a reliable, durable internal organization, and possibly even in terms of having a clear, programmatic party position.

Unfortunately for the party, a stress test came in the form of impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff and corruption charges against former president Lula. The once high approval ratings of President Rousseff, who succeeded Lula, suffered a blow in 2013. Thousands of people, from the lower and upper middle classes, took to the streets to protest the political status quo in what was the largest popular demonstration in two decades.

The protests sometimes lacked a clear agenda or target, yet subsequent corruption scandals involving PT politicians and a stagnant economy shifted most of the anger toward the ruling party and its president. At the same time, political support for the administration from economic and political elites started to evaporate. Rousseff nonetheless narrowly secured a second term in 2014. Yet, she was not able to maintain a governing coalition with the Brazilian Democratic Mobilization Party (PMDB), which at the time was the largest party in Congress, the party of the speaker of Congress, speaker of the Senate, and of the vice-president. The PMDB left the ruling coalition in the context of the succession of reports of fiscal wrongdoings, the sequential arrests of high-ranking *petistas*, Lula's indictments for money laundering and corruption, a prolonged recession, and a hostile media. In April 2016, Rousseff was impeached.

The culmination of the PT's fall from grace preceded the 2016 municipal elections, proving disastrous for the party. At that point and for two main reasons, it was already clear that running for local offices with the PT banner was costly. First, what was once an asset for *petistas* in elections – the party brand – was now a cue for political scandals.¹¹ Second, in comparison to other parties and to previous elections, the PT's capacity to distribute public resources reduced dramatically. Thus, being a PT candidate meant facing voter disapproval and receiving lessened material support. Local politicians with weak linkages to the party could stay loyal to the party and suffer the consequences – or simply switch parties. Many chose the latter, as Figure 7.4 illustrates. Around 35 percent of all PT candidates that had run for mayor in 2012 and also participated in the 2016 mayoral elections switched parties. This represents a 250 percent increase from the PT's disloyalty rate before the first presidency; it puts the PT on par with the average of other parties in the party system.

In sum, the recruitment of brokers from outside the PT's programmatic base, coupled with a severe party crisis, led to a widespread and rapid dismantling of local party organization. To be sure, during the impeachment process, thousands of party activists demonstrated support for the

¹¹ In that year, several PT mayoral candidates refused to use red, the color associated with the PT, and refused to stamp the party's red star on their campaign materials (Seabra, Catia [2016]: "Petistas escondem partido em materiais de campanha e programas de televisão," *Folha de São Paulo*, August 27, 2016). Their ballot number, thirteen, was the only aspect associating them to their party.




FIGURE 7.4 Party switching over time (includes only mayoral candidates who run in two consecutive local elections)

petista government on the streets. Albeit unsuccessful, these pro-government demonstrations showed that the PT still had strong external support from unions, landless movements, homeless movements, and other organized groups (see Etchemendy, this volume). This continued support during the crisis meant the party still had considerable political capital. Moreover, the PT did not turn into another of the many Brazilian parties without programmatic content and lacking solid internal organization. This implied that the party had leverage over brokers embedded in these organizations, as the political influence of these brokers depends on the connections to organized groups.¹² Hence, we should expect a more durable attachment to the party from brokers coming from traditional *petista* sectors. Indeed, Figure 7.5 shows that these brokers present a lower disloyalty rate during the golden age and during the 2016 elections, which we designate as a period of crisis for the PT. Nonetheless, as Hochstetler (2008) notes, the privileged status of the PT vis-à-vis civil society has been eroding. A large portion of unionized workers are no longer under the Central Única dos Trabalhadores union federation – the

¹² For example, local leaders can only operate in unions with party consent.




FIGURE 7.5 Party switching before and after crisis (includes only mayoral candidates who run in two consecutive local elections)

most important external ally of the PT – but belong to others, such as Força Sindical and the União Geral de Trabalhadores (UGT), whose control lies in the hands of rival parties. The weakening of the PT’s ties to external organizations and the presence of stronger competitors may also encourage working-class brokers to leave the party, making their loyalty more uncertain than before.

All told, the party crisis has demonstrated that the support base built by the PT in recent years was unreliable. Table 7.1 presents regression results for party switching in Brazil in order to compare descriptively the rates of party disloyalty across different types of brokers, and to assess whether the crisis entailed greater party switching in the PT relative to other parties. We measure party switching by comparing candidates’ affiliations across elections. If a candidate changed parties between one

TABLE 7.1 *Probability of switching parties*

	All Candidates	Working Class	Non-Working Class
	(1)	(2)	(3)
PT	-0.176 (-0.189, -0.163)	-0.177 (-0.199, -0.155)	-0.173 (-0.188, -0.157)
Crisis	-0.085 (-0.093, -0.076)	-0.087 (-0.106, -0.068)	-0.084 (-0.094, -0.075)
PT* Crisis	0.170 (0.146, 0.195)	0.146 (0.099, 0.193)	0.177 (0.148, 0.206)
Baseline	0.272 (0.268, 0.276)	0.260 (0.251, 0.269)	0.275 (0.270, 0.280)
Observations	58,203	12,241	45,962
Adjusted R ²	0.017	0.024	0.015

Note: "PT" is a dummy variable for running as a candidate of the Workers' Party (PT) in the previous election. "Working-class candidates" are those who list their occupation as blue-collar worker, rural worker, bureaucrat, or teacher. Regressions only include candidates eligible for reelection. In each cell, 95% confidence intervals appear in parentheses.

election and the next, the candidate switched (and the dependent variable is coded as 1); if not, or if the candidate did not run for office in the subsequent election, party switching did not occur (the dependent variable is 0). We find that prior to the party's crisis, PT mayoral candidates were much more loyal than the average, with a rate of party switching that was 17.6 percentage points lower than the baseline rate of party switching of 27.2 percentage points. During the crisis, this PT advantage evaporated. The jump in disloyalty, however, was smaller among working-class brokers who, during the crisis and among *petistas*, presented party switching rates 5.3 percentage points lower than nonworking-class *petista* candidates.

CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INCLUSIONARY TURN

Political brokers – whether elected local officials, subnational leaders of associations, or even evangelical politicians (see Boas, this volume) – have an important function in Brazilian politics, as in many other Latin American polities. We have shown in this chapter that to construct a

project of national power, the PT needed to strike alliances with ideologically unaligned intermediaries outside of its programmatic base. The support of these autonomous and often opportunistic brokers was crucial for this left party's ability to hold the national executive, as well as to consolidate legislative power.

In the short run, this strategy allowed the Workers' Party to construct a national coalition – and thereby implement impressive new social policies. As other contributors to this volume show, the party's policy achievements were substantial (see e.g. Hunter, this volume; and Garay, this volume). The PT created or dramatically expanded the scope of signature social policies, perhaps most notably in the form of *Bolsa Família*, Brazil's famed CCT program. Other reforms offering recognition, access, and resources for the popular sectors were equally impressive, for instance, in the form of new affirmative action programs for university access; subsidizing housing and credit for the poor; and deepening participatory institutions (Mayka and Rich, this volume; and Garay, this volume). As we have shown, clientelistic arrangements with local brokers were critical for the PT's electoral success (see also Novaes 2015, 2018; Alves and Hunter 2017); moreover, the PT's local politicians may need to implement non-programmatic policies while in office, even when these candidates run on programmatic platforms (Johannessen 2020). Nonetheless, according to most accounts, social benefit programs were themselves implemented in a remarkably non-clientelistic way vis-à-vis their beneficiaries (see Hunter, this volume).¹³

Yet, this method of constructing power also very plausibly carried implications for both the quality and the sustainability of the inclusionary turn. The mode of politics that the PT practiced to accomplish its expansion in the North and Northeast was transactional. Even in the PT's historical base in the South and Southeast, this transactional strategy considerably replaced the labor-based and grassroots mobilization that had differentiated the party from all other Brazilian parties. In this, the broker-mediated strategy echoed other kinds of "politics as usual" approaches reflected in the PT's exercise of power, most notably the

¹³ Other policies, such as subsidized credit for big companies through the National Development Bank (BNDES) or large public projects, benefited important economic and financial actors. These actions should also be taken into account to understand the expansion of the PT; according to court documents in the ongoing *Lava Jato* corruption investigation, the companies targeted by these economic policies reciprocated by making generous campaign donations to the party's electoral campaigns, from the presidential to even council candidates' bids.

acceptance, on the part of at least some party leaders, of corruption; two notable examples are the *Mensalão* involving payments to members of other parties for congressional votes during Lula's presidency, and the *Lava Jato* scandal that contributed to Dilma Rousseff's impeachment and Lula's imprisonment. The shift in the social backgrounds of PT candidates during its tenure, which we have documented in this chapter, could possibly have shaped the kinds of policies for which party members and allies lobbied, that is, the extent to which inclusionary policies were given priority, relative to a counterfactual in which brokers from working-class backgrounds retained their earlier predominance in the PT. In any case, given budget constraints, the distribution of resources to coalitional allies (and the bypassing of local opponents, see Bueno 2018) likely carried an opportunity cost. Resources for pork-barrel projects plausibly came at the expense of more inclusionary social spending. Even during the PT's golden age, then, the integration of opportunistic brokers and alliances into traditional Brazilian parties – which were often held together with various forms of pork – may have shaped and constrained the character and extent of inclusionary policy – that is, its *quality*.

Even more clearly, however, the PT's political strategy limited the *durability* of the left party's hold on power outside the national theater. If in the short term distributing resources induced cooperation from allies, in the long term it failed to create programmatic commitment to cement that cooperation once resources dried up. The lack of programmatic bond among the PT and its coalition members ultimately left the party with an open flank: when at the start of her second term, President Rousseff saw herself forced to implement austerity measures to curb spending, there was little she could do to prevent her coalition from crumbling. The PT experienced the rapid exit of its opportunistic and autonomous brokers, compared to brokers recruited from its programmatic base. To be sure, the PT has suffered the departure of activists committed to its programmatic aims as well; but the departure of newer recruits and allies outside its base has been quicker and more severe. Of course, it may not have been feasible for the PT to recruit more ideologically aligned brokers in the North and Northeast. Those regions are especially notable for the relatively small role of the organized, formal sector working class and the importance of local power brokers. Yet, that is part of our point: it is difficult in a decentralized democracy – with substantial economic informality and an attendant role for horizontal networks, decentralized nuclei of power, and often clientelism at the local level – for parties to claim national power without such compromises. These limitations have important general implications for the inclusionary turn in Latin America.

What are the longer-term implications of the PT's ultimately tenuous hold on power for the sustainability of its inclusive policies in Brazil? On the one hand, there are reasons to think that the PT's social achievements can persist to some degree, especially when it comes to "broad and thin" programs like *Bolsa Família* (Hunter, this volume). De la O (2015) argues that divided governments push for rule-based CCTs as a way to prevent the opposition from taking advantage of the program when their turn in power arrives. Moreover, as Hunter (this volume) emphasizes, CCTs have been promoted by parties of the center-right as well as the Left; consider the PAN's role in expanding *Oportunidades* in Mexico, or in Brazil, the role of the PSDB under Fernando Henrique Cardoso in the 1990s in establishing the (smaller) predecessor program to *Bolsa Família*, known as *Bolsa Escola*. Coupled with *Bolsa Família*'s relatively low cost (around 0.5 percent of GDP), these points suggest that the removal of such a policy may be disadvantageous for any party. Social benefits once enacted are often difficult to remove, as many such policies create constituencies for their continuation; CCTs may be similar (see Garay, this volume).

On the other hand, the broader set of inclusionary policies promoted by the PT may be at substantial risk. Indeed, after Dilma Rousseff's impeachment, the Temer government tried to push a market-friendly agenda far from the winning presidential platform without any real opposition from below. A great number of social programs were cut without much resistance, and a broad-reaching labor reform passed, at the same time as Temer dodged an impeachment process in the Congress despite very substantial evidence of malfeasance. Temer's scandals, however, halted further constitutional reforms. Even if *Bolsa Família* itself is not eliminated, benefits offered through the program have already been sharply scaled back.¹⁴ According to most accounts, the ease with which the Temer government was able to promote reforms and escape the impeachment process is due to the distribution of resources to deputies and subnational politicians – many of whom were on the side of the PT a couple of years prior.¹⁵ If the PT had managed to recruit and empower loyal allies to a greater extent, these reversals would have been much more difficult. The 2018 election of right-wing outsider Jair Bolsonaro

¹⁴ "Com redução de 543 mil benefícios em 1 mês, Bolsa Família tem maior corte da história," *Uol Notícias*, August 11, 2017. See <https://noticias.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ultimas-noticias/2017/08/11/bolsa-familia-reduz-543-mil-beneficios-em-1-mes-programa-tem-maior-corte-da-historia.htm> (accessed August 11, 2017).

¹⁵ "Balcão de negócios com recurso público garante vitória governista," *Folha de São Paulo*, August 3, 2017.

(who assumed the presidency in January 2019) credibly puts inclusionary policies at still greater risk.¹⁶

Moreover, the very foundations of the PT now appear in tatters. First, the party has not promoted a new leadership to circumvent the most severe crisis in its history. While prevented from running, Lula was still the center of the PT's presidential campaign in 2018, and the topic of his imprisonment still monopolizes the PT's leadership attention. At a time when national politics has been swinging right with Bolsonaro's presidency, the lack of an organized opposition from the country's largest left-wing party poses additional risks for the continuation of past inclusionary policies. Second, the party's programmatic brand has clearly been tarnished by the scandals as well as a longer-term dissolution of identity, plausibly due in part to the party's alliances with strange bedfellows at the local level. Finally, with the exodus of many of its opportunistic brokers and without resources to hire new local brokers – and given the failure to create enough partisan, ideological brokers during the bonanza years – the PT experienced a 25 percent reduction in total legislative votes, capturing fourteen fewer seats in 2018 than the sixty-nine it won in 2014. There were many peculiarities during the 2018 election that were not present in any previous election in Brazil, and its results may not present an accurate picture of the political landscape, nor the PT's current strength. It is clear, however, that the PT left in place few countermeasures to protect its inclusionary legacy in the face of the conservative wave and the strong *anti-petista* sentiment that swept Brazil in recent years.

The experience of the PT is more broadly a cautionary tale about the difficulty of building sustainable coalitions for inclusion, even in the setting of democratic durability underscored by Kapiszewski, Levitsky, and Yashar (this volume). To be sure, the tensions and difficulties we have identified between programmatic politics and inclusionary social policy, on the one hand, and the pragmatic realities of capturing national power, on the other, are likely to work out for left parties in different ways in different contexts. Broker-mediated incorporation is not an inevitable path for governing left parties in contemporary Latin America: other contexts have seen perhaps greater reliance on electoral-

¹⁶ Despite serving in multiple legislatures, we classify Bolsonaro as an outsider for his unremarkable past as congressman, his reliance on a party that before his victory was marginal in the Brazilian party system, and for his use of nonpartisan, social network linkages to mobilize voters.

professional, media-based appeals (for example, Chile, see Boas 2010), more persistent left-party–union linkages (as in Uruguay, see Etchemendy this volume), or greater reliance on social movement organizations (for instance Bolivia, see Poertner 2018, also Palmer-Rubin, this volume). From one perspective, Brazil could be seen as something of an outlier, with a fragmented party system that makes party switching easier and gives more autonomy and degrees of freedom to brokers; in cases where parties compete within a more enduring and stable party system, the dynamics we identify in this chapter might be less pronounced. From another perspective, however, we have argued that the PT – an externally mobilized party that historically had focused, ideological goals and offered voters programmatic policies – is a least-likely case for broker-mediated incorporation. The challenges it faced in expanding its support base, and the requirement of negotiating with local brokers in a transactional manner, may indeed be the modal experience for left parties in Latin America.

The role of autonomous and opportunistic brokers is even greater in many other contexts: consider, for instance, the power and leverage of Peronist brokers in Argentina. In most countries of the region, growing economic informality has reduced the importance of linkages to unions in the formal sector. Since informal workers tend to organize at a smaller scale than their formal sector counterparts, if at all, informality may multiply the number of leaders of associations, networks, or simply neighborhood groups with whom party higher-ups need to negotiate. Political decentralization has also given new power to local elected officials, although the extent of political decentralization varies across cases, with much more importance in federal systems and less importance in more unitary ones such as Chile (see, however, Luna and Altman 2011). The extent of economic informality and the erosion of party ties to formal sector unions, along with the extent of political decentralization, may plausibly shape the extent to which strategic alternatives to broker-mediated incorporation existed for left parties. Yet, the tensions we identify appear quite prevalent for left parties in the region.

Thus, to the degree that the Left turn in Latin America facilitated greater inclusion – in the form of more recognition, access, and resources for the popular sectors – the fact that even the primary example of an externally mobilized, programmatic left party negotiated with and offered concessions to opportunistic brokers suggests important limitations on the inclusionary turn. To a great extent, these difficulties have to do with

the nature of democratic practice in much of Latin America; and especially with transformations in that practice during the period we consider. The important achievements of the inclusionary turn thus must also be seen in the context of these limitations on their character, reach, and sustainability.

References

- Abranches, Sérgio. 1988. "Presidencialismo de Coalizão: O Dilema Institucional Brasileiro." *Dados* 31(1): 5–38.
- Alves, Jorge Antonio. 2018. "Transformation or Substitution? The Workers' Party and the Right in Northeast Brazil." *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 10(1): 99–132.
- Alves, Jorge Antonio, and Wendy Hunter. 2017. "From Right to Left in Brazil's Northeast: Transformation, or 'Politics as Usual'?" *Comparative Politics* 49(4): 437–455.
- Auyero, Javier. 2001. *Poor People's Politics: Peronist Survival Networks and the Legacy of Evita*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Barbosa Filho, Fernando Holanda, and Rodrigo Leandro Moura. 2015. "Evolução Recente da Informalidade do Emprego no Brasil: Uma Análise Segundo Características da Oferta e Demanda de Trabalho." *Pesquisa e Planejamento Econômico* 45: 101–123.
- Boas, Taylor C. 2010. "Varieties of Electioneering: Success Contagion and Presidential Campaigns in Latin America." *World Politics* 62(4): 636–675.
2016. *Presidential Campaigns in Latin America: Electoral Strategies and Success Contagion*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Bueno, Natália S. 2018. "Bypassing the Enemy: Distributive Politics, Credit Claiming, and Non-State Organizations in Brazil." *Comparative Political Studies* 51(3): 304–40.
- Bussell, Jennifer. 2018. "When Do Middlemen Matter? Experimental Evidence on Corruption in India." *Governance* 31: 465–480.
- Camp, Edwin. 2016. "Cultivating Effective Brokers: A Party Leader's Dilemma." *British Journal of Political Science* (July): 1–23.
- Collier, Ruth Berins, and David Collier. 1991. *Shaping the Political Arena*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Collier, Ruth Berins, and Samuel P. Handlin. 2009a. "Logics of collective action, state linkages, and aggregate traits: The UP-Hub versus the A-Net." In *Reorganizing Popular Politics: Participation and the New Interest Regime in Latin America*, edited by Ruth Berins Collier and Samuel Handlin, 61–92. Pennsylvania State University Press.
- 2009b. *Reorganizing Popular Politics: Participation and the New Interest Regime in Latin America*. Pennsylvania State University Press.
- De la O, Ana. 2015. *Crafting Policies to End Poverty in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Do Amaral, Oswaldo E., and Timothy J. Power. 2016. "The PT at 35: Revisiting Scholarly Interpretations of the Brazilian Workers' Party." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 48(01): 147–171.
- Dunning, Thad. 2008. *Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Eaton, Kent. 2011. "Decentralization and Federalism." In *The Routledge Handbook of Latin American Politics*, edited by Peter Kingstone and Deborah J. Yashar. New York: Routledge.
- Falleti, Tulia G. 2010. *Decentralization and Subnational Politics in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Feierherd, G. 2017. "Does the Left Breed Economic Informality? Party Strategies and Selective Enforcement in Brazil." Unpublished Manuscript.
- Fujiwara, Thomas. 2011. "A Regression Discontinuity Test of Strategic Voting and Duverger's Law." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 6(3–4): 197–233.
- Garay, Candelaria. 2007. "Social Policy and Collective Action: Unemployed Workers, Community Associations, and Protest in Argentina." *Politics & Society* 35(2): 301–328.
- Goldfrank, Benjamin. 2011. *Deepening Local Democracy in Latin America: Participation, Decentralization, and the Left*. Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Gómez Bruera, Hernán F. 2015. "Participation under Lula: Between Electoral Politics and Governability." *Latin American Politics and Society* 57(2): 1–20.
- Hagopian, Frances. 2007. *Traditional Politics and Regime Change in Brazil*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hochstetler, Kathryn. 2008. "Organized Civil Society in Lula's Brazil." In *Democratic Brazil Revisited*, edited by Peter Kingstone and Timothy Power, 33–53. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Holland, Alisha C., and Brian Palmer-Rubin. 2015. "Beyond the Machine: Clientelist Brokers and Interest Organizations in Latin America." *Comparative Political Studies*, 0010414015574883.
- Hunter, Wendy. 2010. *The Transformation of the Workers' Party in Brazil, 1989–2009*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Johannessen, Peter G. 2020. "Linkage Switches in Local Elections: Evidence from the Workers' Party in Brazil." *Comparative Political Studies* 53(1): 109–143.
- Keck, Margaret E. 1995. *The Workers' Party and Democratization in Brazil*. Yale University Press.
- Larreguy, Horacio, Cesar E. Montiel Olea, and Pablo Querubín. 2017. "Union Members as Political Brokers: Partisans or Agents?" *American Journal of Political Science* 61(4): 877–891.
- Larreguy, Horacio, John Marshall, and Pablo Querubín. 2016. "Parties, Brokers and Voter Mobilization: How Turnout Buying Depends upon the Party's Capacity to Monitor Brokers." *American Political Science Review* 110(1): 160–179.
- Levitsky, Steven. 2003a. *Transforming Labor-based Parties in Latin America: Argentine Peronism in Comparative Perspective*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

- 2003b. "From Labor Politics to Machine Politics: The Transformation of Party–Union Linkages in Argentine Peronism, 1983–1999." *Latin American Research Review* 38(3): 3–36.
- Levitsky, Steven, James Loxton, Brandon Van Dyck, and Jorge I. Domínguez. 2016. *Challenges of Party-Building in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Luna, Juan Pablo. 2010. "Segmented Party? Voter Linkages in Latin America: The Case of the Udi." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 42(2): 235–356.
- Luna, Juan Pablo, and David Altman. 2011. "Uprooted but Stable: Chilean Parties and the Concept of Party System Institutionalization." *Latin American Politics and Society* 53(2): 1–28.
- Lupu, Noam. 2013. "Party Brands and Partisanship: Theory with Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Argentina." *American Journal of Political Science* 57(1): 49–64.
- Mainwaring, Scott. 1999. *Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil*. Stanford University Press.
- Mares, Isabela, and Lauren Young. 2016. "Buying, Expropriating, and Stealing Votes." *Annual Review of Political Science* 19(1) 267–288.
- Mazucca, Sebastian L. 2010. "Access to Power versus Exercise of Power: Reconceptualizing the Quality of Democracy in Latin America." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 45(3): 334.
- Meneguello, Rachel. 1989. *PT: A Formação de Um Partido, 1979–1982*. São Paulo: Paz e Terra.
- Montero, Alfred P. 2012. "A Reversal of Political Fortune: The Transitional Dynamics of Conservative Rule in the Brazilian Northeast." *Latin American Politics and Society* 54(1): 1–36.
- Montero, Alfred P., and David J. Samuels. 2004. "The Political Determinants of Decentralization in Latin America: Causes and Consequences." In *Decentralization and Democracy in Latin America*, edited by A. P. Montero and D. J. Samuels, 3–32. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Novaes, Lucas M. 2015. "Modular Parties: Party Systems with Detachable Clienteles." PhD thesis, University of California, Berkeley.
2018. "Disloyal Brokers and Weak Parties." *American Journal of Political Science* 62(1): 84–98.
- Panbianco, Angelo. 1988. *Political Parties: Organization and Power*. Vol. 6. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pereira, Carlos, and Bernardo Mueller. 2004. "The Cost of Governing Strategic Behavior of the President and Legislators in Brazil's Budgetary Process." *Comparative Political Studies* 37(7): 781–815.
- Pereira, Carlos, Timothy J. Power, and Eric D. Raile. 2008. "Coalitional Presidentialism and Side Payments: Explaining the Mensalão Scandal in Brazil." Unpublished manuscript.
- Poertner, Mathias. 2018. "Capturing Votes, Creating Partisans: The Organizational Roots of New Parties in Latin America." PhD thesis, Berkeley: University of California.

- Przeworski, Adam, and John Sprague. 1988. *Paper Stones: A History of Electoral Socialism*. University of Chicago Press.
- Ribeiro, Pedro Floriano. 2014. "An Amphibian Party? Organisational Change and Adaptation in the Brazilian Workers' Party (1980–2012)." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 46(1): 87–119.
- Roberts, Kenneth M. 2002. "Social Inequalities without Class Cleavages in Latin America's Neoliberal Era." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 36(4): 3–33.
- Rodrigues, Iram Jácome, Mario Henrique Guedes Ladosky, and Jonas Bicev. 2016. "Sindicalização E Representatividade Das Centrais Sindicais No Brasil." *Trabajo Social* 27: 43–62.
- Roemer, John E. 2006. *Political Competition: Theory and Application*. Harvard University Press.
- Samuels, David. 2003. *Ambition, Federalism, and Legislative Politics in Brazil*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Samuels, David, and Cesar Zucco. 2015. "Crafting Mass Partisanship at the Grass Roots." *British Journal of Political Science* 45(4): 755–775.
2016. "Party-Building in Brazil." In *Challenges of Party-Building in Latin America*, edited by Steven Levitsky, James Loxton, Brandon Van Dyck, and Jorge I. Domínguez, 305–330. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Sarmiento, Domingo Faustino. 1845. *Facundo o civilización y barbarie en las pampas argentinas*. ISBN 987-1093-21-7.
- Scott, James C. 1969. "Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change." *American Political Science Review* 63(4): 1142–1158.
1972. "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia." *American Political Science Review* 66(1): 91–113.
- Shefter, Martin. 1994. *Political Parties and the State: The American Historical Experience*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Stokes, Susan C., Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno, and Valeria Brusco. 2013. *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Van Dyck, Brandon. 2014a. "Why Party Organization Still Matters: The Workers' Party in Northeastern Brazil." *Latin American Politics and Society* 56(2): 1–26.
- Van Dyck, Brandon Philip. 2014b. "The Paradox of Adversity: New Left Party Survival and Collapse in Latin America." PhD thesis.
- Van Dyck, Brandon, and Alfred P. Montero. 2015. "Eroding the Clientelist Monopoly." *Latin American Research Review* 50(4): 116–138.
- Weyland, Kurt. 1996. *Democracy Without Equity: Failures of Reform in Brazil*. University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Zucco, Cesar. 2008. "The President's 'New' Constituency: Lula and the Pragmatic Vote in Brazil's 2006 Presidential Elections." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 40(1): 29–49.
- Zucco, Cesar, and Timothy J. Power. 2013. "Bolsa Família and the Shift in Lula's Electoral Base, 2002–2006: A Reply to Bohn." *Latin American Research Review* 48(2): 3–24.