CHAPTER 3

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# The Problem-Solving Repertoire: Direct Action and Associational Participation

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How do Latin American citizens participate in the interest arena? While the changing character of interest representation in the region, typified by the decline of robust union-party linkages during recent decades, may imply new constraints on political participation, it may also afford opportunities for novel modes of political problem-solving. The emergence of new forms of associational life, in particular, has captured recent analytic attention (Chalmers et al. 1997; Foweraker 2001; Korzeniewicz and Smith 2000; Oxhorn 1998b). Yet scholars have largely lacked systematic and comparative data with which to evaluate claims about emergent forms of interest intermediation. In Chapter 1, Collier and Handlin distinguish the interest arena and the electoral arena; whereas participation in the electoral arena involves voting and other partisan activities, citizens may also undertake "direct action," that is, make a variety of direct appeals to state officials or engage in other types of state-targeted claim-making, and they may participate in associations, for purposes of either state-targeted collective claim-making or society-targeted provisioning. This chapter investigates these latter forms of participation in the interest arena.[1] What kinds and patterns of political problem-solving strategies are most prevalent? What channels of direct action do citizens employ, and to what extent do they actually participate in the newly proliferated

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[1] This chapter analyzes data from a survey administered to a probability sample of individuals from the capital cities of Argentina, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela. The survey instrument and sampling design are described further in Chapter 1 and the appendices of this volume.

associations that have been so widely noted? To what degree do individuals find the interest arena a useful site for solving problems? How do the popular sectors differ from the middle class in this regard?

As two kinds of individual engagement in the interest arena, both direct action and associational participation are important components of interest representation. As outlined in Chapter 1, direct action involves discrete, state-targeted activities, in which individuals typically voice demands regarding single, specific problems or issues that may come up at a particular moment. Given this broad definition, there may be substantial variety in the form of direct action. Citizens may target the state at various levels (from local to national); the character of direct action may be more institutionalized (e.g., signing of petitions) or more contentious (e.g., participating in protests). Furthermore, direct action can be atomized, as in individual, face-to-face interaction with authorities; or it can be collective, involving either face-to-face interaction between collectivities and authorities or larger efforts such as petition drives or protests, in which demands are voiced more distantly. These different forms of direct action may correspond as well to the range of objectives individuals pursue: personal or particularistic problems might be especially well-addressed by face-to-face contacts, especially atomized contacting, while participating in protests or signing petitions may correspond to more general demands for policy changes or larger group benefits. The key point is that these various modes of direct action all involve the voicing of specific demands or claims on the state.

In contrast to direct action, associations tend to have a multifaceted existence beyond any single particularistic issue or specific claim-making activity, and they tend to

work in relation to a set of general concerns or issue areas that may or may not involve state-targeted demands (see Chapters 5 and 7). The associations on which this chapter mainly focuses are "programmatic" associations, in that they exist in order to address collective problems or advance goals that have been conceptualized as political in Chapter 1. (Associational participation will generally be used to refer to participation in such programmatic associations; where participation in non-programmatic associations is analyzed, this is explicitly noted). Thus, these organizational units of what Collier and Handlin term the Associational Network (the A-Net) may pursue diverse activities (see Chapter 5), both making claims on the state and providing useful vehicles for collective provisioning of a variety of local public goods that could be, but for one reason or another may not be, supplied by the state. They may also serve as conduits for state-program implementation. As a means for political problem solving, associational participation may differ from direct action in various ways. Relative to direct action, participation in associations may be a more sustained kind of problem-solving, though individual participation in associations may of course wax and wane over time and across different issue domains. In addition, since associations engage general issues and problems of concern to members or participants, they may be less likely to serve as a means for obtaining particularistic benefits for individual members or participants.

Who, then, contacts or accesses the state through direct action, and who participates in associations? Past studies of political participation, particularly in the developed world, emphasize that income, education, and other socio-economic variables explain political participation, from voting to protests (Verba and Nie 1972; also Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). In the Civic

Voluntarism Model of Verba et al. (1995), socio-economic status is argued to influence participation by providing "resources," like time, money, and politically relevant skills; by promoting engagement with politics; and by influencing the mobilization of citizens (see also Brady et al. 1995). In Latin America, too, those with higher socioeconomic status have traditionally been seen as having better direct access to the state, for many kinds of reasons. Whether making personal, particularistic claims or demands for group benefits, those with higher class status may draw, *inter alia*, on reservoirs of human capital, time, money, and social connections (Kurtz 2004, O'Donnell 1979, Schneider 2004); elite groups may also be able to overcome collective-action problems by virtue of their relatively smaller numbers (Olson 1965), engendering disproportionate influence on policy-making as well as asymmetric personal access to the state. The popular sectors, on the other hand, may disproportionately lack the resources and contacts for many kinds of direct action, although they may retain an organizational or numerical advantage in others, for instance protests (López Maya and Lander 2005, Dietz and Myers 2002). The question of a class bias in accessing the state may be particularly relevant in the contemporary period, as the role of traditional vehicles for popular-sector interest representation such as union-party linkages has waned in the wake of rising economic informality and marketization (Portes and Hoffman 2003). This chapter therefore emphasizes comparisons of patterns of direct action by social class, drawing from this volume's emphasis on descriptive representation as a useful diagnostic for evaluating bias in the interest arena: asking whether the incidence of specific demands on the state is symmetric or asymmetric across classes may allow us to assess the evenness with which access to the state (if not influence) is distributed.

With respect to associations, the resources of time, money, and politically relevant skills associated with socio-economic status may also play an important role in promoting participation, so that the possibility of a bias against popular-sector participation is present for associations as well. On the other hand, various forms of "social capital," including experience with various modes of collective action, the ability to draw on wide social networks, and ties to communities may be particularly important for associational participation; in this regard, associations working with the popular sectors could enjoy certain organizational and numerical advantages.[2] Some recent analyses have noted that the rise of "associative networks" in Latin America may even provide a privileged site for representation of the popular sectors, relative to the middle classes (Chalmers et al. 1997: 544-45, 568). Yet these analyses have not been able to exploit systematic and representative data on individual participation in the contemporary interest regime. These hypotheses about who participates in associations and about what kinds of factors facilitate associational participation have therefore gone untested.

Related to the issue of participation in associations is the extent to which associations are perceived as useful vehicles for making claims on the state and/or for providing local public goods and services through provisioning activities; presumably individuals would tend to participate more in associations they think are effective. By analyzing individual-level data in terms of perceived efficacy of associations, this chapter also lends a "subjective" lens on the capacity of different parts of the institutional infrastructure to function as representational vehicles.

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[2] While the resource-based model of Brady et al. (1995) emphasizes the role of socialization through organizational involvement, other accounts give an even more central role to social networks in explaining political participation (Lake and Huckfeldt 1998; also Putnam 1993).

The aim of this chapter is thus to compare distinct modes of participation in the interest arena, in particular, forms of direct action and associational participation. The chapter examines who participates and how, with particular attention to class differences in participation rates across different forms or channels of problem solving in the interest arena. In addition, though the chapter investigates aggregate patterns across the four countries studied, it also focuses on cross-national differences, as different national settings may provide different incentives and structures for individual patterns of participation. Finally, in multivariate analyses, this chapter also investigates individual correlates of participation, above and beyond popular-sector membership, which allows us to explore how involvement in social networks, past experience with organizational activity, and other factors may promote individual problem solving through associational participation and direct action. Together, these steps in the analysis contribute to a portrait of individual participation in the contemporary interest arena.

## OPERATIONALIZING MODES OF POLITICAL PROBLEM SOLVING

The above distinctions imply a typology of modes of political problem solving based on two nominal dimensions, as depicted in Table 3.1, in which direct action and associational participation form the rows, and atomized and collective problem solving form the columns. Note first that the lower-left-hand cell is empty because associational participation is a pre-eminently collective form of problem-solving, one in which citizens by definition cannot engage in an atomized fashion. The table thus identifies three types of political problem solving in the remaining cells: atomized direct action, collective direct action, and (collective) associational participation. Within the categories of atomized and collective direct action, modes of problem solving are further classified by

whether they are unmediated, in the sense that the individual herself is engaging state authorities, or intermediated, in that the individual is contacting another actor to solve a problem with the state on her behalf. The table also indicates the ways in which these types of participation have been operationalized through a questionnaire administered in the capital cities of Argentina, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela (see Appendix C).

With respect to direct action, the analysis focuses on a series of survey questions identifying whether respondents had in the previous five years sought to resolve problems by contacting an official, agency, or program of the national, provincial, or municipal government or by engaging in a legal action; these forms of direct action are considered unmediated. Two other types of intermediated problem solving were also investigated: contacting a political party and contacting an influential intermediary, both of which can be understood as involving actors that intermediate between state and society.[3] Each of these activities may be conducted individually, in an atomized fashion, or they may be engaged in as part of a broader social network, for instance, as part of a group from the neighborhood, from work, or from other venues.[4] In addition, surveys asked about two forms of direct action that are considered *ipso facto* collective acts: participation in a protest and signing a petition.[5] Respondents who have engaged in a form of direct action

[3] Respondents were asked whether they had attempted to contact "a person with influence and contacts to help you or to recommend how to resolve problems such as those we have been discussing" (Argentine questionnaire) in the previous five years. A follow-up question, specifying the person the respondent sought to contact with the greatest frequency, asked about the purpose for which the respondent sought to contact this person. "Gaining access to a state entity" was one of the response categories that was coded for this open-ended question.

[4] Respondents who had engaged in each of these activities were then asked with whom they had done so on the most recent occasion. Those who did so alone or with family members were coded as having engaged in a direct action in an atomized fashion; those who did so with acquaintances from a neighborhood association, a political party, work, church, or some other source engaged in direct action collectively.

[5] Signing a petition is conceptualized here as an unmediated form of collective direct action, since individuals signing petitions directly give voice to specific, concrete demands; however, the organization of petition drives obviously does involve intermediation to some extent.

could then be coded as having participated in either an atomized or collective fashion, as described in the cells of the upper row of Table 3.1. Associational participation is operationalized as involvement on a regular basis in several kinds of groups and organizations named in the surveys. These programmatic associations include, as set forth in the lower-right-hand cell of Table 3.1, associations of the unemployed, cooperatives, place-of-origin associations, and associations dealing with criminality or food distribution. Note that we do not here include unions; as noted in Chapter 1, unions are important popular organizations in the interest arena, but the present study focuses specifically on associations. Also, the types of associations

**Table 3.1. Operationalizing Problem Solving in the Interest Arena**

| | **Atomized**<br>(Alone or with family members) | **Collective**<br>(With acquaintances from work, the neighborhood, or other sources) |
|---|---|---|
| **Direct Action** | Unmediated:<br>o Contact the government<br>o Engage in a legal process<br><br>Intermediated:<br>o Contact political party<br>o Contact influential intermediary | Unmediated:<br>o Contact the government<br>o Engage in a legal process<br>o Sign a petition<br>o Participate in protest<br><br>Intermediated:<br>o Contact political party<br>o Contact influential intermediary |
| **Associational Participation** | [Empty] | Participation in programmatic popular associations, including:<br>o Neighborhood<br>o Anti-crime (protection)<br>o Food distribution<br>o Parents<br>o Women<br>o Regional/place-of-origin<br>o Cooperatives<br>o Unemployed |

included in Table 3.1 obviously do not exhaust the range of associations in the interest regime, but they are taken to be especially important for popular-sector participation. A host of other associations, such as religious and recreational associations, draw the participation of many people but are essentially non-programmatic (see Chapter 1); though we do not include these in Table 3.1 as instances of associational participation in the interest regime, we will nonetheless examine the incidence of participation in recreational and religious groups at various points below.[6]

## PATTERNS OF PROBLEM SOLVING: THE AGGREGATE PICTURE

An aggregate analysis of patterns of political problem solving reveals that rates of participation in programmatic associations are quite high, reaching an estimated 36 percent for associations across the four capital cities in our study.[7] This figure is impressive, even compared to many developed countries; for instance, Verba et al. (1995: 80) report that in Europe, estimated rates of voluntary associational participation were 31 percent in Spain, 27 percent in France, and 26 percent in Italy. The same study found that an estimated 79 percent of the population of the United States reported participating in an association (Verba et al. 1995: 63); yet that study analyzed many more types of associations than the set of programmatic associations analyzed in this volume.[8] (Indeed,

[6] In the analyses below, it is indicated whether both non-programmatic and programmatic associations or only programmatic associations are considered.

[7] To estimate population parameters, sampling weight ratios are used to adjust for over-sampling of respondents in focus districts, using the inverse of the probability of selection and then setting the effective sample size at the number of interviews. For estimates by country, country-specific weights are used.

[8] The way in which Verba et al. (1995) arrive at this estimate is similar to the present study: respondents were asked about involvement with specific types of associations (veterans', religious, recreation, neighborhood, etc.), some of which took political stands and some of which did not. An aggregate measure of associational participation based on having reported participating in any of these specific types of association was then created. When respondents were asked a general question regarding whether they were members in any association, however, only 49 percent indicated membership (Verba et al.1995: 62, note 11).

including just religious-based and recreational associations would boost the rate of participation to nearly 60 percent in the four Latin American countries.) The level of associational participation in Latin America is therefore quite impressive in comparative terms.

The incidence of direct action is perhaps surprisingly high as well. Indeed, while increasing associational participation has been widely noted in the literature, direct action as a mode of representation in the contemporary interest arena has gone largely unremarked. Yet the survey results indicate that this form of activity is quite important. Pooling across countries, we observe participation rates of 27 and 17 percent in collective and atomized direct action, respectively; engagement in direct action as a whole approximately matches participation in associations.[9] Though we lack fully comparable aggregate data on patterns of direct action in other developing and developed countries, disaggregated estimates presented in section 4 suggest that rates of collective and atomized direct action are impressive in comparative terms as well.

Behind this aggregate picture, however, lies substantial variation across the four countries (Figure 3.1). Peru in particular stands out in terms of associational participation, with 55 percent of citizens participating in programmatic associations; in Peru, unlike the other three countries, the rate of associational participation exceeds the sum of the rates of atomized and collective direct action (41 percent).[10] In Chile and

[9] An estimated 4.6 percent of citizens in the pooled universe have engaged in both atomized and collective claim-making, i.e., one form of direct action listed in Table 3.1 in a collective fashion and another form of direct action in an atomized fashion. Note that for the disaggregated forms of direct action listed in Table 3.1 and discussed in section 4 (contacting the government, engaging in a legal process, and so on), atomized and collective direct action are mutually exclusive, because survey questions asked about the most-recent occasion on which respondents engaged in direct action.

[10] The Peruvian surveys were fielded shortly after the fall of Alberto Fujimori, widely perceived to have instituted a semi-authoritarian government. While this could account for an upsurge in mobilization in general, and while associational life might have also surged outside of Lima, it is unlikely to account for

Venezuela, associational participation exceeds either form of direct action alone, though together the two forms of direct action outpace associational participation. In Argentina, associational participation rates are similar to Chile's and substantially higher than Venezuela's; however, associational participation is surpassed by collective direct action, underscoring the high level of direct action in that country. Nonetheless, despite this cross-national variation, the evidence underscores the importance of associational participation: even in Argentina, for instance, where the incidence of direct action outstrips associational participation, the relative frequency of associational participation there is still greater than in Spain, France, or Italy (Verba et al. 1995: 80).

There are important cross-national differences in direct action as well, particularly when one compares the incidence of atomized and collective direct action. Comparing across countries, collective direct action is particularly prevalent in Argentina and Peru, while atomized direct action is high Argentina and Chile. Argentina has the highest rates of both collective and atomized direct action (33 and 24 percent, respectively), while Venezuela stands out in terms of low rates of all forms of political problem solving, including both collective and atomized direct action (18 and 9 percent, respectively). These important cross-national differences should be borne in mind and will be analyzed further below.

Overall, the data suggest that collective problem solving is relatively prevalent. Not only is associational participation robust, but within the category of direct action, collective direct action is relatively important; only in Chile does the incidence of atomized direct action outstrip collective direct action.

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the much higher participation among *limeños* in the types of associations we consider here, relative to other capital cities in our study. See the discussion below of the question of mobilization during "normal" versus "crisis" moments.

**Figure 3.1. Problem Solving in Cross-National Perspective**
(Percent)




## DIRECT ACTION

What kinds of direct action are most prevalent in Latin America, and who engages in direct action? In this section, I examine these two questions in turn, focusing respectively on the incidence of unmediated versus intermediated direct action and on the incidence of associational participation as well as the issue of differential participation.

The literature suggests several hypotheses that might guide our expectations. With respect to the incidence of various kinds of direct action, we might expect that,

following the literature on patronage politics and clientelism in Latin America, contacting political parties and influential intermediaries would play a particularly important role in problem solving. Relatedly, we might also expect variation across different Latin American countries in this respect; for instance, in more ``developed" countries that also feature relatively institutionalized party systems (Argentina, Chile), we may expect a relatively important role for party intermediation, while we might also expect a larger role for both parties and influential intermediaries in countries like Argentina where patronage politics appear particularly widespread. With respect to question of who participates, individuals possessing resources associated with social class may be expected to engage in direct action at higher rates, as elites and members of the middle-class are often alleged to have special access to the state in Latin America. We might therefore expect atomized direct action to be especially prevalent among the middle classes relative to the popular sectors. One contrary expectation is that the popular sectors may retain an organizational advantage in protests, which may also act as a substitute for other, more proximate ways of voicing demands on the state. In addition, involvement in social networks or various individual-level indicators of social capital may be important predictors of participation.

Table 3.2 confirms, across the disaggregated forms of direct action, the cross-national pattern suggested by Figure 3.1: rates of atomized participation are strikingly lower in Venezuela, and to some extent in Peru, than in Chile and Argentina.[11] In Chile and Argentina, direct contact with government officials at the local or national level is a

[11] Standard errors for estimates in Table 3.2 and elsewhere in this paper are calculated as for a simple random sample, a common approach that may be reasonable even for the analysis of much more complex sampling designs than the one used here (see, e.g., Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995: 535-537; Kish and Frankel, 1974).

predominant form of direct action, and its incidence dwarfs participation in contentious claim-making in those two countries (i.e., protest). (It should be noted that the data reported here do not reflect participation in the intense and "unique" episodes of protest surrounding the 2001-02 crisis in Argentina and the 2002 unsuccessful coup in Venezuela but instead refer to more "regularized" patterns of interest politics through direct action). Commonalities exist across the countries in the relative importance of unmediated problem-solving activities. Contacting, protesting, and petitioning the state are all relatively widepread.[12]

Of the three unmediated forms of direct action, contacting an office or program might be expected to be the most prevalent, and, indeed, it ranks very high in all the countries. The importance of the others, however, is striking. In Argentina and Venezuela, signing a petition is an even more prevalent form of making state-targeted demands than contacting the government; it is nearly as important in Peru, and still relatively substantial in Chile.[13] Petition-signing in Latin America is fairly impressive in comparative perspective as well.For instance, more than 26 percent of the Buenos Aires sample signed petitions, compared to an average of 35 percent nationally in the United States from 1973-1990 (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993: 43).

[12] Comparing these data to estimates presented by Verba and Nie (1972: 59, Table 3-2) suggests that government contacting may also be quite prevalent relative to other developed or developing countries. Their data, for a national sample (which may underestimate the incidence of contacting compared to a sample of the capital city) suggests that 6 percent of Austrians and 10 percent of Nigerians had contacted local officials with others to resolve a community problem. The rates at which citizens engaged in particularized contacts (similar to atomized contacting) at the local level were: 16 percent in Austria, 12 percent in India, seven in Japan, 38 percent in the Netherlands, two percent in Nigeria, and 20 percent in the former Yugoslavia (the latter at all levels of government).

[13] Note that our surveys in Venezuela preceded the petition drive associated with the attempt of the political opposition to remove President Chávez from office in 2003-2004, through a recall referendum that eventually took place in August 2004.

Protest activity is also an important form of direct action. Participation in protest is most prevalent in Peru, where nearly 18 percent of residents of metropolitan Lima had participated in a protest in the previous five years, and least prevalent in Chile. Differences in patterns across countries are thus substantially different with respect to contentious action, relative to institutionalized action: for instance, protest rates in Peru approach the rates at which citizens in Argentina and Chile contact the government. That protest is also quite prevalent in Argentina and Venezuela may be surprising, since, again, survey questions asked separately about protests apart from the unusual episodes of protests during the crisis periods in each country.[14] While it is appropriate to compare countries on a measure of mobilization and protest during relatively normal times, as in Table 3.2, separate analysis reveals that 13.1 percent of Venezuelans in metropolitan Caracas reported participating in demonstrations related to the conflict over President Hugo Chávez during 2002-03, while 16.8 percent of Argentines reported participating in a *cacerolazo* during the unrest associated with the crisis surrounding the devaluation of the peso.[15] Clearly, extraordinary circumstances can mobilize people into action.

In contrast to unmediated direction action, intermediated direct action such as contacting political parties and influential individuals as intermediaries – those activities most associated with clientelism – are relatively uncommon. Even legal suits generally outpace problem solving through.influential individuals or political parties. The relative infrequency with which citizens solve problems through party representatives and

[14] In Peru, protests emerged in connection with the end of the Fujimori regime. Many important protests were concentrated in the south and the central Andean region, however, while our surveys were fielded in Lima. Our high estimate of protest rates in Peru may therefore underscore the elevated level of contentious mobilization in the capital during "usual" as well as "crisis" times.

[15] In other words, during these moments of crisis, participation in protests in Venezuela and Argentina rose to the level found in Peru -- which may again underscore the high level of activation in the latter country.

influential intermediaries, must be considered in light of the emphasis that analysts have placed on clientelism and the increasingly non-programmatic orientation political parties, which, it has been argued, have become more clientelistic and more reliant on selective benefits.

**Table 3.2. Direct Action in Cross-National Perspective**
(Percent)

| | | Argentina | Chile | Peru | Venezuela |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Unmediated** | **Contacted government** | 20.33 (1.05) | 20.67 (1.05) | 16.06 (0.95) | 8.70 (0.73) |
| | **Engaged in legal process** | 7.47 (0.68) | 7.09 (0.67) | 7.47 (0.68) | 6.71 (0.65) |
| | **Signed a petition** | 26.61 (1.16) | 9.44 (0.76) | 12.54 (0.86) | 11.93 (0.85) |
| | **Participated in protest** | 9.92 (0.78) | 6.09 (0.62) | 17.61 (0.99) | 8.86 (0.74) |
| **Intermediated** | **Contacted political party** | 7.54 (0.69) | 2.96 (0.44) | 4.43 (0.53) | 1.98 (0.36) |
| | **Contacted influential intermediary** | 1.90 (0.35) | 2.61 (0.41) | 0.73 (0.22) | 0.71 (0.22) |

Percent estimates in the cells are calculated using country-specific sampling weights; reported percentages therefore differ from unadjusted sample percentages. Standard errors are in parentheses.

With respect to differences across countries, it is perhaps unsurprising that citizens infrequently contact representatives of political parties in both Peru and Venezuela, two countries that underwent near-wholesale party system collapse in the decade prior to the surveys. Peru was somewhat higher on party contacting than Venezuela at the time of our surveys, a difference that is consistent with analyses that have found a rapid recovery of partisan identification in Peru in the wake of party system collapse (Seawright 2007b).[16] Yet the point estimate for party contacting in Chile, a country with a tradition of well-institutionalized parties with particular appeal to the

[16] The proportion of Lima residents who contacted APRA and Fujimori's party (Cambio 90) was roughly the same, with other parties being contacted at lower rates.

popular sectors, is *lower* than either Peru or Argentina. And while Argentina scores highest on party contacting -- perhaps unsurprisingly, given a history of party ties to the popular sector and an important role for clientelist appeals by the Peronists (Levitsky 2003, Stokes 2005) -- rates of party contacting in Argentina are statistically on par with engaging in legal processes (and party contacts are less frequent than engagement in legal processes in the other three countries). The aggregate picture is thus one in which party contacting is an infrequent channel for direct action in the interest arena; while overtime comparisons are not possible, the data confirm the present distant relationships between political parties and society suggested by previous analysts.

The low rate at which citizens contact influential intermediaries for purposes of accessing a state entity is also surprising. Various studies have emphasized the important role of clientelism in contemporary Latin American democracies (e.g., Roberts 1995, Weyland 1999, Stokes 2005), and clientelism or patronage politics may surely involve asking powerful intermediaries for help with contacting a state entity. Yet in no capital we surveyed have more than three percent of citizens contacted an influential intermediary.[17] The greatest estimated incidence occurs, unexpectedly, in Chile, a country in which clientelistic politics is sometimes said to play a less important role.

It should be noted that instances of unmediated direct action may also take the form of clientelistic relations; local power brokers may in fact be state officials, and citizens may contact them face-to-face for the purposes of receiving selective benefits. The overall conclusion, then, is not necessarily that patronage and clientelism are not

[17] Some patronage brokers may be representatives of political parties, of course, yet this does not fully explain the counterintuitive findings – since party contact rates are also so low.

widespread, but that these relationships rarely take the specific form of a purely intermediated linkage between citizens and the state, a form that previous literature would have suggested to be much more common.

Another possibility is that societal "brokers," rather than receiving requests from citizens and then using their power to contact the state, might help citizens themselves engage in unmediated direct action by accompanying them in the activity or recruiting them to other activities such as protests and petitioning,. The CIRELA surveys allow us to explore this question by examining how often direct action activities were conducted in conjunction with local leaders (*dirigentes*) of neighborhood associations, unions or work organizations, churches, or political parties. Table 3.3. suggests the substantial importance of local leaders (*dirigentes*) in this sort of activity. Pooling across countries, 60 percent of respondents who had engaged in protests reported that *dirigentes* had played a role. Such *dirigentes* played much less marked roles in legal processes, but these leaders also helped in contacting both political parties and people of influence (final column of Table 3.3).

There are notable contrasts across countries. Peru in particular stands out for the role of *dirigentes* in aiding protests as well as in contacting political parties; over 71 percent of protest participants had done so together with a local leader, an observation that might go some way towards explaining the heightened overall level of protest in Peru discussed above. In the other three countries, the role played by leaders was similar with respect to protests, while local leaders or brokers appear to play a bigger role in the contacting of intermediaries in Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela and a reduced role in Peru. These results, particularly those for individual countries, should be interpreted

with some caution as the numbers of respondents who have participated in several forms of direct action are small within countries, and thus standard errors in Table 3.3. are large,[18] and the numbers regarding the activity of particular types of "leaders" is particularly small, rendering it impossible to interpret the degree to which "clientelism" rather than "representation" may be involved. Nevertheless, brokerage is clearly an important element of direct action.

**Table 3.3. The Role of Brokers in Cross-National Perspective**
(Percent of participants saying a "leader" (*dirigente*) had helped, in each form of direct action)

| | **Argentina** | **Chile** | **Peru** | **Venezuela** | **pooled** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Contacted government** | 19.57<br>(6.08) | 47.79<br>(9.02) | 55.35<br>(4.88) | 54.78<br>(17.57) | 44.78<br>(3.30) |
| **Contacted a political party** | 47.76<br>(9.12) | 33.55<br>(13.65) | 65.75<br>(7.57) | 57.00<br>(11.61) | 56.37<br>(4.44) |
| **Contacted influential intermediary** | 60.54<br>(10.99) | 62.91<br>(11.26) | 42.81<br>(9.15) | 71.20<br>(9.65) | 54.86<br>(5.10) |
| **Engaged in legal process** | 1.69<br>(3.37) | 16.20<br>(10.78) | 49.50<br>(7.57) | 45.62<br>(11.71) | 35.67<br>(4.79) |
| **Participated in a protest** | 39.91<br>(6.31) | 38.23<br>(8.29) | 71.06<br>(3.17) | 39.66<br>(6.62) | 60.26<br>(2.40) |

Survey questions asked respondents whether a leader (*dirigente*) of a neighborhood committee or political party, or one from work,or church, had helped them with respect to each form of direct action. Petitions are omitted, as respondents were not asked about the role of a leader (*dirigente*) in helping them with petitions. Percent estimates in the cells are calculated using country-specific sampling weights; reported percentages therefore differ from unadjusted sample percentages. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Within the broader framework of these regional and country-level trends in direct action, three further questions regarding descriptive representation based on class are important for understanding popular-sector representation in the interest arena, To what

[18] In addition, there was fairly substantial non-response on the question about the role of *dirigentes*, even for those respondents who had said they had participated in a particular form of direct action. This conceivably could indicate that the role of *dirigentes* is even more important than it appears, if respondents are reluctant to reveal the role of leaders. The percentages in Table 3.3. are calculated using only respondents who responded to the question about *dirigentes*.

extent is there class bias in terms of who participates in the different kinds of direct action? Does social class help predict the tendency of individuals to engage in certain kinds of direct action in an atomized fashion and others in a collective fashion? Finally, how does the perceived efficacy of these different forms of problem solving—in terms of type of activity and in terms of whether it is carried out individually or collectively—vary across social classes?

To probe the extent of bias or representational distortion, the popular sector is understood to comprise those who have not finished high school (*educación secundaria*).[19] This threshold implies that the popular sector includes an estimated 44 percent of the study population across our four countries; among the rest of the population, termed the "middle class," 26 percent have finished high school but have no college education, and 29 percent have at least some college education. It should be borne in mind that this approach to defining the popular sector may provide a conservative estimate of the size of this group in each country; however, an alternate threshold, in which those who have finished high school but have no further education are included in the popular sector, does not alter the conclusions discussed below.[20] The distribution on the education variable is also broadly similar across countries, which helps to bolster cross-national comparability.

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[19] Students finish high school (*educación secundaria*) after twelve years of education in Chile and eleven years in Peru and Venezuela. Constructing the threshold based on academic degree rather than years of education helps to obviate problems of non-comparability across countries.

[20] Indeed, as explored in a working-paper version of this chapter, including those who have finished secondary education but have no further education in the popular sector only sharpens many differences between the popular sector and the middle classes (now, those who have some college education) -- presumably because the latter becomes a more homogenous group.

The evidence suggests that the popular sectors are significantly less likely to engage in virtually the entire range of direct action than the middle classes (Table 3.4).[21] This observation is perhaps unsurprising for institutionalized forms of direct action, given the widely asserted relationship between socioeconomic status and access to the state in Latin America (O'Donnell 1979, Kurtz 2004, Schneider 2004); the representative distortion involved in petition-signing, where more than 20 percent of middle-class citizens but less than 13 percent of the popular sectors participate, mirrors patterns in both the developing and developed world.[22] Strikingly, however, this class bias in the use of channels for interest articulation also extends to forms of direct action that may be assumed to be more closely associated with the popular sectors – namely, protest. Even in this form of claim-making action, the middle classes engage at statistically higher rates than the popular sectors.

Further observations may be made about class and atomized or collective forms of direct action.. It was noted above that in the aggregate, collective direct action is more prevalent than is atomized direct action (Figure 3.1). Table 3.4 reveals that this relatively high participation in collective direct action is due to the high frequencies of petition-signing and protest; among all modes of direct action that can be engaged in either atomized or collective fashion—that is, all modes *except* petition-signing and protest—atomized participation is more common. The difference between the percent engaged in atomized and collective direct action, for all such activities, is positive and statistically

[21] See the note to Table 3.4.
[22] For instance, Rosenstone and Hansen (1993: 43) find that 18% of Blacks and 38% of Whites had signed petitions, on average, from 1973-1990 in the United States. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993: 48) also point out a very large and negative effect of three educational categories (less than 9, 9-12, and more than 12 years of schooling).

significant, and this holds for both the popular sectors and for the middle classes; the only exception is that middle-class (but not popular-sector) citizens are significantly more likely to have contacted a political party collectively.[23] On average, among actions that can be undertaken either in atomized or collective fashion, citizens report having engaged in atomized direct action roughly twice as frequently as collective direct action.

Up to this point, this section has concentrated on the *incidence* of different forms of direct action. Probing the perceived *efficacy* of direct action is also valuable, because it affords a more subjective window on the capacity of different modes of interest intermediation to function as representational vehicles. Efficacy is measured here by exploiting a survey question asking respondents who had engaged in each form of direct action, how much that action, when last they undertook it, had helped to resolve the problem in question; those who answered "a lot" or "some" were coded as having engaged in a claim-making action that was perceived to be effective.

The results in Table 3.5 suggest several observations. In terms of perceived effectiveness, contacting an influential intermediary ranks highest; second comes legal action, which is seen to be especially effective in its collective forms. Protest and petition-signing are also perceived as relatively effective, as is contacting a party (but more so in its collective forms). Strikingly, the point estimates suggest that contacting the

[23] In Table 3.4, standard errors for the differences in the percentages across columns A and B (*within* classes) may be calculated as follows. First, treat sub-sample groups (e.g., the popular sectors or the middle-classes) as a simple random sample of these groups from the population. Then, conditioning on each group, the sample proportions have a trinomial distribution with parameters $p$ (the proportion of the group engaged in individual action), $q$ (the proportion engaged in collective action), and $z$ (the rest of the population, who have done neither), with $p + q + z = 1$. The estimate of the difference in rates of individual and collective action for each kind of activity is provided by the sample quantity $\hat{p} - \hat{q}$, and the estimated variance of this difference is:

$$\frac{1}{n}\left[\hat{p} + \hat{q} - (\hat{p} - \hat{q})^2\right].$$

The reported standard error is the square root of this estimated variance.

government is perceived to be the *least* effective means for advancing a claim through direct action (with the possible exception of claims advanced in an atomized fashion by middle-class citizens). In other words, citizens who have engaged in which might be thought of as political problem-solving *par excellence* -- the contacting of government officials -- are the least likely to rate their direct action as useful.

**Table 3.4. Incidence of Direct Action, Pooled Sample**
(Percent)

| | | Atomized Direct Action (A) | | Collective Direct Action (B) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Popular sectors | Middle class | Popular sectors | Middle class |
| Institutionalized | Contacted government | 11.22 (0.62) | 12.82 (0.58) | 4.03 (0.38) | 6.68 (0.43) |
| | Engaged in legal process | 4.08 (0.39) | 5.58 (0.40) | 2.01 (0.27) | 3.74 (0.33) |
| | Contacted a political party | 2.91 (0.33) | 2.40 (0.27) | 1.91 (0.27) | 3.28 (0.31) |
| | Contacted an influential intermediary | 0.92 (0.19) | 1.22 (0.19) | 0.35 (0.11) | 0.55 (0.13) |
| | Signed a petition | N/A | N/A | 12.60 (0.65) | 20.46 (0.70) |
| Contentious | Participated in a protest | N/A | N/A | 10.21 (0.59) | 12.89 (0.58) |

Percent estimates are calculated using sampling weights for the pooled sample. Standard errors are in parentheses. Signing a petition and participating in a protest are coded as collective forms of direct action, which is why N/A appears in the columns for atomized direct action (see Table 3.1 and accompanying text). Other notes are as in the previous tables.
The middle classes are significantly more likely than the popular sectors to have participated in each form of direct action, with the exception of contacting an influential intermediary (in either atomized or collective forms) and contacting a party in an atomized form; for these latter forms of direct action, the difference is not significant. The estimated standard error for this difference is the square root of the sum of the estimated variances for each percentage estimate.

In addition, a comparison of Tables 3.4 and 3.5 suggests several disconnects between the incidence of different forms of direct action and their perceived effectiveness. For instance, notwithstanding the greater incidence of atomized direct action (among claims that could be made either collectively or in an atomized fashion),

collective claims on the state are seen as significantly more effective; this trend is evident both among the popular sectors and the middle-class. The estimated difference between the perceived effectiveness of atomized and collective claims is substantively large and negative; pooling across classes, it is statistically significant for all categories of direct action.[24] For all categories of collective claim-making, a majority or near-majority of those who had made a claim collectively reported that the action was effective, while for several kinds of atomized action, only a minority reported such satisfaction.

The same kind of disconnect between incidence and efficacy emerges across different types of direct action: there is relatively less participation in forms of direct action that citizens report as most effective, and conversely, citizens primarily engage in—or feel able to engage in—forms of action that are considered least effective. For instance, contacting an influential intermediary is viewed as more effective than making other kinds of claims, yet as seen above, it is also the least prevalent.[25] We cannot gain further leverage with these data on why this might be the case; it could be, for instance, that only relatively well-connected people are able to contact influential and effective intermediaries, This possibility may suggest that clientelism may be a more pervasive way for patrons—particularly political patrons—to build support than it is for citizens, on average, to benefit. That is, the fundamentally asymmetrical patron-client relationship, especially for the popular sectors on an individual basis, may take place primarily

[24] When we disaggregate by class, as in Table 3.5, the sample size is reduced, resulting in lower-power statistical tests; within the middle-class group and within the popular sector group, the estimated difference between the perceived effectiveness of atomized and collective action is statistically significant at standard levels only for some of the categories of direct action, though the sign of the difference is negative for all kinds of direct action.

[25] The difference is significantly different from zero only when we pool across social classes. Sample sizes are small: since the question involves effectiveness of a given claim *conditional* on having made a claim at all. Table 3.2 indicates that the proportions making each kind of claim are small and especially within social classes; for instance, less than one percent of the popular sector has contacted an influential intermediary for purposes of accessing an entity of the state.

through the initiative of the patron and may not be accessible to the client. The goal here is not to estimate the causal effect of contacting influential intermediaries but rather to describe the rates at which such channels for interest intermediation are actually employed and to probe the way in which participants evaluate their actions in terms of a subjective sense of their effectiveness in the interest arena. Like the finding that atomized action is more frequent but is viewed as less effective than collective action, these results raise intriguing questions for future analysis.

**Table 3.5. Perceived Efficacy of Direct Problem-Solving, Pooled Sample**
(Percent)

| | **Atomized Direct Action (A)** | | **Collective Direct Action (B)** | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **Popular Sectors** | **Middle Class** | **Popular Sectors** | **Middle Class** |
| **Contacted government** | 39.28 (2.90) | 40.39 (2.42) | 43.56 (2.81) | 48.36 (3.43) |
| **Contacted a political party** | 39.45 (5.77) | 37.49 (5.58) | 53.58 (7.16) | 55.70 (4.86) |
| **Contacted influential intermediary** | 55.00 (10.98) | 58.13 (7.89) | 62.32 (17.03) | 63.11 (11.62) |
| **Engaged in a legal process** | 43.05 (4.89) | 50.38 (3.74) | 59.24 (7.06) | 60.66 (4.54) |
| **Participated in a protest** | N/A | N/A | 52.15 (3.15) | 54.49 (2.50) |
| **Signed a petition** | N/A | N/A | 48.67 (2.91) | 50.74 (2.09) |

Notes are as in previous tables.

Thus far the question of who engages in different forms of direct action has been assessed by cross-tabulating rates of participation by country and by social class. Yet it will also be useful to explore a richer set of individual-level covariates through multivariate analysis, estimating a logistic regression model, with data pooled across countries, in which the dependent variable is participation in any form of atomized or, alternatively, collective direct action. This strategy will also allow us to assess the

independent effects of class and other factors. Of particular interest are factors such as social capital, organizational capacity from past involvement in popular organizations, current immersion in social networks, or extensive neighborhood ties.[26] Two indicators of past involvement in collective action and organizational life (other than participation in programmatic associations) are particularly germane to popular-sector experience: involvement with a union at any point in the past and having participated in an urban land invasion.[27] These forms of organization and collective action were particularly important prior to the recent proliferation of associations and to the emergence of the A-Net: unions, of course, were the primary popular organizations of the UP-Hub, and starting in the 1950s, land invasions were important means of claiming land for settlement in the popular neighborhoods where much of the population of Latin America's capital cities now lives. Past union participation is a type of collective action through relatively *formal* organizations, while land invasions occur through *informal* networks (though informal invasion groups often subsequently formed the basis of more formal neighborhood associations in the new settlements).[28] Current immersion in social networks is measured with a variable tapping involvement (in the past five years) in non-programmatic religious or recreational associations. Finally, neighborhood ties are proxied by the time in current residence. The analyses include controls for gender, age, and the square of age (intended to capture a possible non-monotonic relationship between

[26] These variables might, of course, be particularly important for predicting associational participation, in addition to direct action; the next section considers this question and compares results to those presented in this section.

[27] The survey question regarding unions asked respondents: "at any moment in your life, have you belonged to a union or a professional (guild) association (*asociación gremial*)?" The survey question regarding land invasion asked: "Did you come to live in this place [your current residence] by participating in a land invasion?"

[28] Most land invasions are carried out in groups and in more or less organized but ad hoc form, and, of course, they clearly lack the kind of regulatory relationship to the state, much as in the distinction between formal and informal sectors of the workplace; see Dosh (2006) and Roever (2007).

age and participation); because of the very different average rates of participation across countries (see Figure 3.1), country dummies are also included.[29]

The results (Table 3.6) confirm the above suggestion that class matters for direct action: popular-sector members make direct claims at lower rates than the rest of the population. However, organizational involvement plays a role as well: controlling for class, past union membership significantly increases the probability of direct action, though participation in a land invasion plays no discernible role (the coefficient estimate on the latter variable is negative but not significant). Social networks also appear to matter: involvement in religious/recreational associations is a strong predictor of direct action. However neighborhood ties, as measured by time in current home, do not play a comparable role: such ties are weakly associated with participation in atomized direct action, and they exhibit a *negative* relationship to collective direct action, even controlling for age. Age is positively related to participation, while its square is negatively related (people engage in direct action more as they age, and then begin to participate less); women also participate more than men, though, surprisingly, only in the case of atomized direct action.[30] The evidence is thus consistent that class, as well as resources beyond those associated with socioeconomic status, appear to be important for participation in direct action: in particular, past union involvement and immersion in social networks.

As often is the case, the empirical findings are open to various interpretations. It may well be that experience in unions or religious/recreational associations play a causal

[29] We thus exploit within-country variation to estimate the coefficients of our logistic regression models.

[30] The signs of the coefficients on the country dummies simply capture the rates of atomized and collective direct action in each country relative to the omitted category of Peru; the estimated relationships are consistent with Figure 3.1.

role in facilitating direct action by, for example, providing members with the social or material resources, organizational know-how, or human capital. For instance, it is plausible that a sense of empowerment or a belief in the efficacy of activism might arise from a history of participation in unions.[31] On the other hand, people who selected into unionized workplaces in the Union-Party Hub might be different from those who did not in (partially unobservable) ways, which may also drive propensities to engage in direct action today. Still, the fact that unionized status tended to be extended to all similarly situated workers as part of their jobs (i.e., union membership was not extended on a selective basis to some workers and not others on the same shop floor) might belie this interpretation. Experience with collective action in the old interest regime may indeed play a role in facilitating claim making in the new interest arena.

In sum, the evidence in this section shows that the popular sectors engage in direct action at lower rates than the middle classes, and this holds for both atomized and collective direct action, though the differences may not always be substantively large (see Table 3.4). Some forms of direct action, such as contacting influential intermediaries, rare, while other forms, such as contacting state officials, signing petitions, and engaging in protests, appear quite robust. There is also substantial variation across countries in the degree to which citizens engage in direct action and in the kinds of direct action in which they participate.

[31] See Dosh (2006); Di Tella et al. (2007) and Galiani et al. (2006) study the effects of land titling after land invasions on various political and economic variables. For instance, Di Tella et al (2007) use a natural experiment to investigate the effects of land titling in Argentina, finding that property awards to land invaders influenced beliefs about the rewards to individual effort.

**Table 3.6. Covariates of Direct Action**
**(Logistic Regression)**

| | Atomized Direct Action | Collective Direct Action |
|---|---|---|
| | Estimated coefficient (s.e.) | Estimated coefficient (s.e.) |
| Popular sector | -0.464* (0.086) | -0.420* (0.068) |
| Union | 0.611* (0.110) | 0.658* (0.093) |
| Land invasion | -0.195 (0.165) | -0.012 (0.106) |
| Religious/recreational participation | 0.326* (0.084) | 0.720* (0.065) |
| Time in current home | -0.004 (0.003) | -0.006* (0.003) |
| Age | 0.099* (0.013) | 0.049* (0.010) |
| Age squared | -0.001* (0.000) | -0.001* (0.000) |
| Female | 0.184* (0.083) | 0.070 (0.065) |
| Argentina | 0.961* (0.112) | 0.389* (0.081) |
| Chile | 0.715* (0.123) | -0.920* (0.110) |
| Venezuela | -0.208 (0.160) | -0.460* (0.111) |

Definitions: "Programmatic" associations include the types associations listed in the lower-right hand cell of Table 3.1. "Popular sector" –respondent has not completed high school; "Union" – respondent has participated in a union or work association/guild (*gremio*) at any time in the past; "Land invasion" – respondent obtained current home through land invasion; "Time in current home" – years respondent has lived in current residence; "Religious/recreational participation" – has participated in a religious or recreational association. Other variables are self-explanatory. A constant is estimated but not reported. * significant at the 0.05 level.

The finding that collective direct action is relatively uncommon, among the sub-set of institutionalized direct actions that may be either atomized or collective, suggests that in order to understand how individuals pursue collective activities for the purpose of solving political problems, we must turn from focusing on collective direct action, and instead focus on associational participation. Despite its perceived effectiveness, collective direct action is not routinized in the same way as institutional participation: it is by nature a low-incidence activity. Given the vastly greater incidence of associational participation

relative to direct action (see Figure 3.1), it is plausible that associations provide an important alternative vehicle through which citizens achieve representation. The next section therefore turns to an investigation of associational participation.

## ASSOCIATIONAL PARTICIPATION

As in the analysis of participation in direct action, this section investigates the incidence of associational participation both within and across countries, with special attention to patterns of participation by class. Since associations may engage in a wide variety of problem-solving activities – from state-targeted claim making to society-targeted provisioning of goods or services -- this section also identifies the kinds of interests that are pursued through associational participation. As throughout the text, "associational participation" refers principally to participation in the programmatic associations listed in Table 3.1. However, a host of other associations, such as religious or recreational groups, may also draw the participation of many people. Although these are non-programmatic groups and as such are not included in the interest arena as conceptualized in this project, it is sometimes suggested that such groups can provide social ties or networks that may facilitate participation in the programmatic associations of primary interest here. For that reason, participation in such religious or recreational associations is also analyzed here.

Table 3.7 presents a snapshot of associational participation, disaggregated by types of association (programmatic versus all associations) and by country.[32] As suggested by Figure 3.1 above, participation rates are strikingly high in Peru and low in

[32] The data on associational participation come from survey questions that asked respondents whether, in the last five years, they had participated in the specific types of programmatic associations listed in Table 3.1. Other questions asking about participation in religious or recreational associations are also exploited.

Venezuela, with Argentina and Chile falling somewhere in between. This pattern largely holds for non-programmatic associations as well as the programmatic associations considered in Figure 3.1. It also holds with respect to the *intensity* and *duration* of associational participation: the proportion of citizens who participate in associations more than once a week, and the proportion participating in any association for more than five years.[33] For these intensity and duration indicators, as with the aggregate participation rates, Peru scores highest and Venezuela scores lowest, while Argentina and Chile occupy an intermediate position. Though this observation accords with earlier studies of Peru, which have found a substantially high rate of associational participation in that country relative to other Latin American countries (e.g., Dietz 1998: Ch. 6), the sharp contrast in participation in Peru and Venezuela is nonetheless striking.[34]

While much attention has focused on the rise of popular associations as a new development potentially giving new expression to popular-sector interests, one must inquire about class-based distortion in associational participations. Do members of the popular sector participate more or less in associations than the middle classes? On the one hand, as with direct action, resources of time and money may be important facilitators of participation, producing the positive relationship between socio-economic status and associational participation found in studies of the developed world (Verba et al. 1995). On the other hand, in Latin America associational life in popular neighborhoods has often been seen as especially vibrant; recently, scholars have also analyzed the potential of a "new associationalism" to provide privileged arenas of

[33] Here we exploit survey questions that asked respondents how often they participate in associational activities; and also how long they have been involved in an organization.
[34] Some of the vitality of associational life in Peru at the moment the survey was fielded (in 2002) might be due to the recent fall of Fujimori, but that factor cannot explain the high percentage of Peruvians who participated in an association for more than five years.

participation and channels for representation among the popular sectors (Chalmers et al. 1997). In addition, the kinds of political connections that may favor the incidence of, especially, unmediated direct action among the middle class may be less important for explaining associational participation, leading to an equalization of associational participation across classes.

Despite expectations in the literature that associations may provide a means for especially vibrant political problem solving among the popular sectors, in fact the middle classes participate in associations at significantly higher rates than the popular sectors (fourth and eighth rows of Table 3.7). This trend can be observed at the aggregate level for programmatic associations, and it also results when non-programmatic associations are considered. In Argentina, for instance, the percent of popular-sector respondents who participate in associations of any kind is an estimated 17 percentage points lower than middle-class respondents; in Venezuela, the estimated difference is nearly 13 percentage points, and in Chile, it is nearly six percentage points.[35] The only exception to this pattern of class-based distortion is Peru, where the estimated difference between the percentage of popular-sector and middle-class citizens who have participated in associations, while negative, is not significant (Table 3.7).[36] This initial evidence may therefore belie the suggestion that the activation and invigoration of associational participation among the popular sectors might help close the historical, class-based representational gap.

What kinds of functions are served in the interest arena by the associations in which citizens participate? Specifically, do citizens perceive the associations in which

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[35] Similar results obtain with a more expansive definition of the popular sectors that includes high-school graduates (not reported).

[36] As we will see below, this finding also holds when we use an alternate, more expansive threshold, including high school graduates among the popular sectors. This group including those who have not finished high school and those who have (but have no college) comprises 70 percent of the population.

they participate as making claims on the state, or are associations instead perceived as engaging in societal provisioning? In what kinds of associations do members of the popular sector participate—and thus to what extent does the current interest regime make up for the low levels of popular-sector claim-making through direct action?

**Table 3.7. Associational Participation by Country**
(Percent)

| | Argentina | Chile | Peru | Venezuela |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Programmatic associations** | 27.55<br>(1.16) | 28.26<br>(1.17) | 54.73<br>(1.29) | 21.91<br>(1.08) |
| **> once a week** | 11.89<br>(0.84) | 8.46<br>(0.72) | 26.57<br>(1.15) | 11.75<br>(0.84) |
| **> five years** | 10.20<br>(0.91) | 12.39<br>(1.04) | 25.87<br>(1.55) | 7.69<br>(0.87) |
| **Participation Difference (Pop. Sectors – Middle Class)** | -12.18*<br>(2.35) | -5.02*<br>(2.21) | -1.90<br>(2.70) | -7.10*<br>(2.14) |
| **Programmatic plus recreational or religious associations** | 43.43<br>(1.29) | 51.55<br>(1.30) | 74.13<br>(1.14) | 35.93<br>(1.25) |
| **> once a week** | 24.48<br>(1.12) | 27.11<br>(1.16) | 45.38<br>(1.29) | 22.64<br>(1.09) |
| **> five years** | 26.80<br>(1.53) | 34.73<br>(1.70) | 47.04<br>(2.10) | 19.04<br>(1.35) |
| **Participation difference (Pop. Sectors – Middle Class)** | -16.67*<br>(2.56) | -5.83*<br>(2.64) | -2.35<br>(2.40) | -12.75*<br>(2.48) |

Calculated using sampling weights appropriate for country-specific analysis. "Programmatic" associations are non-union, non-recreational, and non-religious groups. The "Participation Difference (Pop. Sectors – Middle Class)" is the difference in the percent who have participated in any non-union association or any programmatic association, across the popular sector and middle class groups. Estimated standard errors for this difference condition on the group and assume a simple random sample within groups.
* indicates that the difference is significant at the 0.05 level or less, based on a two-tailed *z*-test.

To answer these questions, the analysis exploits a series of survey questions that asked, of each respondent who self-identified as a participant in a given association, the extent to which that association engaged in claim-making and/or provisioning activities. Respondents who said their association engaged "a lot" or "some" in claim-making/provisioning activities are coded as a participant in a claim-making/provisioning

association.[37] Note that the categories are not mutually exclusive: a respondent may deem a given association in which he or she participates a vehicle for *both* claim making and provisioning, or he/she might deem one association as engaged in claim making and another as engaged in provisioning.[38] Indeed, the data suggest substantial overlap: an estimated 25.2 percent of citizens participate in claim making and provisioning associations and an estimated 56.1 percent participate in neither, while just 18.7 percent participate in one type but not the other. This observation is consistent with the finding of Kapiszewski (Chapter 6) that many associations engage in both claim making and provisioning.

Notwithstanding this overlap, rates of participation in provisioning associations are markedly higher than participation rates in claim-making associations (Figure 3.2). Individuals therefore tend to participate at high rates in associations oriented toward helping the participants themselves than they do in those oriented toward making state-targeted claims. An estimated thirty percent of the study population pooled across countries belongs to a claim-making organization, while nearly forty percent of the population belongs to a provisioning association; this difference holds up and is statistically significant across all countries, though it is more pronounced in Peru and

[37] The two relevant questions, asked for each type of association, were worded as follows (author's translation). Claim making: "How much does or did this (association) work to present issues to the government that are important for you? Would you say that the (association) works or worked a lot, some, a little, or not at all (for this purpose)?" Provisioning: "And how much does or did this association help its members to organize themselves to resolve important problems by their own means? Would you say that the association helps or helped a lot, some, a little, or not at all?" Note that the word "member" (*socio*, also partner) in this final question can be understood as applying to participants -- since it follows a question in which responds are asked if they have "participated" in the activities of the association in the previous five years (and only those who said yes were asked the follow up question).

[38] In the latter case, the respondent would be coded as a participant in both claim-making and provisioning organizations (though for purposes of calculating associational participation rates, the respondent is coded as participating as long as he or she has participated in at least one association, and otherwise is a non-participant).

Chile than in Argentina or Venezuela.[39] Other sub-sample analyses (not reported) show that this pattern holds up in both the popular sectors and middle classes, and also within associations of different types (see Table 3.1).[40] In the aggregate, then, though associations individuals choose to participate in are perceived to engage in substantial claim making, they tend to be seen more as vehicles for provisioning.

As Table 3.8 indicates, Latin Americans participate in quite high levels in religious and recreational associations. In terms of assessing participation in programmatic associations, a comparison to these other two is instructive. Pooling across countries, participation in programmatic associations (as an aggregated category) reaches an estimated 36 percent in total: a rate that far outpaces individual participation in either religious or recreational groups.[41] On the other hand, no single type of programmatic association has estimated participation rates over fifteen percent, which suggests that different individuals choose to participate in distinct types of associations (the "breadth" of individual associational participation is analyzed below).

In addition, confirming the aggregate finding above, Table 3.8 shows that the popular sectors participate at substantially lower rates than the rest of the population in

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[39] To calculate standard errors and thus perform significance tests, a similar approach is used as the one described in connection with Table 3.4 above.

[40] Interestingly, although food, protection, parents', women's, and place-of-origin associations and cooperatives are more likely to be perceived as engaging in self-provisioning, neighborhood and religious associations are only slightly less likely to be identified as claim-making (as opposed to provisioning) groups.

[41] It may be instructive to compare the estimates in Table 3.8 to a set of higher estimates for the United States. Verba et al. (1995: 63, Table 3.6) estimate affiliation rates in the United States of 12 percent for unions, 21 percent for recreational (hobby, sports, leisure) associations, 12 percent for neighborhood organization, and 4 percent for women's rights groups (see the note below regarding this latter category). On the other hand, the estimated rates of participation in food distribution and parents' associations here – 13 percent in both cases –may be quite high in comparative perspective, as is the estimate of 22 percent involvement in religious groups in the present analysis (compare Verba et al.'s estimate of 12 percent in the United States, from a survey taken in 1990).

**Figure 3.2. Participation in Self-Provisioning and Claim-Making Associations**
(Percent)




nearly all types of associations.[42] The lower rates of participation among the popular sectors is all the more striking, given that the surveys asked about many types of associations that presumably are of particular relevance to the popular sectors (e.g., food distribution groups, cooperatives, associations of the unemployed) and did not include the types of "post-materialist" associations (e.g., environmental associations) for which a middle-class bias might plausibly be anticipated.[43] Again, this evidence challenges the

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[42] Exceptions may be unions and food and women's associations, where the difference between popular sectors and the middle classes is not significant. It may be worth noting that these women's groups may or may not make claims on the state; they may be groups of women that engage in provisioning as they approach a whole range of problems from health, education, food, children and child care and so on. Thus they may not be strictly comparable to the women's rights groups discussed in the previous note.

[43] As above, separate analysis (not shown) confirms that these results persist when employing the alternate, less restrictive measure of the popular sectors. Indeed, when we include high school graduates among the popular sectors some of the results are strengthened, presumably because the upper-education group becomes more homogenous: for instance, the popular sectors participate at substantially and significantly lower rates across every type of association, both programmatic and non-programmatic.

view that associations might play a privileged role in the representation of lower classes in the contemporary interest regime.

Finally, note that just 39 percent of citizens who had gotten together with neighbors or others to solve problems "by their own means" (*por sus propios medios*) said that the assistance of a local leader (*dirigente*) had been helpful -- substantially lower than the proportions who said that a *dirigente* had helped them attend a protest or contact a political party (see Table 3.3). This suggests a potentially important contrast between direct action and associational participation, one that is more fully explored elsewhere in this volume.[44] While nothing in the conceptualization of the A-Net precludes the existence of clientelist networks or patronage networks as important features of associational life (see Chapter 1), the survey evidence does suggest the plausibility that local groups can retain important autonomy in this respect.

[44] The question of linkages between associations and political parties as well as labor unions is taken up elsewhere in this volume (see Chapter 7).

**Table 3.8. Incidence of Associational Participation**
(Percent)

| | | Total sample | Popular sectors (A) | Middle classes (B) | Difference (A – B) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Programmatic | TOTAL | 35.93 (0.62) | 30.92 (0.90) | 39.92 (0.85) | -9.00* (1.24) |
| | Neighborhood | 13.45 (0.44) | 11.80 (0.63) | 14.77 (0.62) | -2.97* (0.84) |
| | Protection | 8.86 (0.37) | 5.81 (0.46) | 11.29 (0.55) | -5.48* (0.72) |
| | Food | 13.28 (0.44) | 12.66 (0.65) | 13.78 (0.60) | -1.12 (0.88) |
| | Parents | 13.27 (0.44) | 11.32 (0.62) | 14.83 (0.62) | -3.51* (0.87) |
| | Women | 2.11 (0.19) | 1.79 (0.26) | 2.36 (0.26) | -0.57 (0.37) |
| | Place-of-origin | 2.18 (0.19) | 1.59 (0.24) | 2.65 (0.28) | -1.06* (0.37) |
| | Cooperative | 3.22 (0.23) | 1.64 (0.25) | 4.48 (0.36) | -2.84* (0.44) |
| | Unemployed[1] | 0.85 (0.17) | 1.13 (0.28) | 0.60 (0.20) | 0.53* (0.25) |
| | Union | 12.42 (0.43) | 12.00 (0.63) | 12.75 (0.58) | -0.75 (0.86) |
| Non-programmatic | Church/religious | 21.52 (0.53) | 20.36 (0.79) | 22.44 (0.73) | -2.08* (1.06) |
| | Recreational | 21.17 (0.53) | 15.02 (0.70) | 26.07 (0.76) | -11.05* (1.88) |
| **Programmatic and non-programmatic associations, excluding unions** | | 54.00 (0.65) | 46.48 (0.97) | 60.00 (0.85) | -13.52* (1.29) |

Categories are non-exclusive, so sums across the types of associations (i.e., down the columns) may exceed the percent of respondents who have participated in aggregate categories of associations (i.e., the first row and the last). Estimates are calculated using sampling weights for the pooled sample.
* significant at the .05 level.
1 This question was asked in Argentina and Chile only. Country-specific sampling weights are used for estimates reported in this row.

I now turn to the individual correlates of associational participation. Is social class in fact the major predictor, or do other variables play an important role? Do other individual-level factors better predict associational participation, controlling for class? As with direct action, this question is pursued through a multivariate analysis, estimating a logistic regression model that includes as covariates variables such as past organizational links, experiences with collective action, immersion in social networks,

and neighborhood ties; the proxies for these variables are union involvement at any time in the past, gaining one's residence through land invasion, participation in religious/recreational groups, and time in current home. The logical relation of these variables is the same for associational participation as for direct action; in addition, however, they may be intimately linked to associational life in other ways. For instance, informal land invasion groups sometimes formed the basis of more formal neighborhood associations in the new settlements, a type of association included in this study and a primary type that existed in the periphery of the UP-Hub. Because of the potential importance of recreational and religious groups as vehicles for entry into programmatic associations, we also analyze predictors of participation in an aggregate category including both programmatic and non-programmatic associations (in which case we obviously drop religious/recreational participation as a covariate). All analyses control for gender, age, the square of age (intended to capture a possible non-monotonic relationship between age and participation), and country dummies.

As anticipated by the cross-tabulations above, the results suggest that members of the popular sectors participate at significantly lower rates than the middle class, even controlling for other variables (Table 3.9). Strikingly, however, the apparent relationship between previous involvement in forms of collective action (i.e., past union participation and/or participation in land invasion) and participation in non-programmatic associations is substantially stronger than the effect of class, as the calculations of marginal effects reported in Table 3.9 show. For instance, while being a member of the popular sector decreases the probability of participating in a programmatic association by 6.1 percentage points (when other variables are set at their median values), having been a union member

is associated with an increase in the probability of associational participation by 17.8 percentage points.[45] Past participation in a land invasion is associated with an increase in the probability of associational participation of 7.2. Finally, religious/recreational activity is associated with an increase of 18.9 percent in the probability of associational participation.[46]

The empirical findings are again open to various interpretations. Past organizational links (as proxied by past involvement in unions), experiences with collective action, and immersion in social networks through recreational or religious groups may have a causal effect on associational participation in various ways. On the other hand, some people may be "joiners" who have unobserved sources of propensities to participate, which may drive involvement with unions, land invasion groups and non-programmatic associations as well as the programmatic associations in which we are interested. Estimating causal effects is not so much the interest here as it is describing the types of individuals who participate in the interest arena through associational participation.

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[45] In Tables 3.8 and 3.9, the baseline individual (who has an estimated probability of associational participation of 60%) is not a member of the popular sector; has never been a member of a union; did not get her house through a land invasion; is 38 years old; is female; has lived in her current home for 12 years; is Peruvian; and does not participate in a religious or recreational association. (Obviously, for purposes of calculating the "marginal" effect of being female, the baseline individual is instead assumed male, and so forth).

[46] Note, however, that not all measures of social networks or ties appear important. For example, the indicator of neighborhood ties, "time in current home," does not have a statistically significant relationship to associational participation, controlling for the other variables in the specification. Interestingly, this finding persists if we take as the dependent variable participation in neighborhood associations alone (not reported).

**Table 3.9: Covariates of Associational Participation**
(Logistic Regression)

| | **Programmatic associations** | | **Programmatic, religious, and recreational associations** | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **Estimated coefficient (s.e.)** | **Estimated marginal effect (s.e.)** | **Estimated coefficient (s.e.)** | **Estimated marginal effect (s.e.)** |
| **Popular sector** | -0.244* (0.084) | -.061* (0.021) | -0.290* (0.061) | -0.057* (0.016) |
| **Union** | 0.774* (0.127) | 0.178* (0.026) | 0.752* (0.092) | 0.112* (0.016) |
| **Land invasion** | 0.294* (0.130) | 0.072* (0.031) | 0.356* (0.106) | 0.060* (0.022) |
| **Age** | 0.105* (0.014) | 0.026* (0.003) | 0.033* (0.009) | -0.006* (.002) |
| **Age squared** | -0.001* (0.000) | -0.000* 0.000 | -0.001* (0.000) | N/A |
| **Female** | 0.344* (0.083) | 0.086* (0.021) | 0.009 (0.059) | 0.002 (0.014) |
| **Time in current home** | -0.004 (0.003) | -0.001 (0.001) | -0.001 (0.002) | -0.000 (0.001) |
| **Argentina** | -0.988* (0.113) | -0.236* (0.026) | -1.132* (0.077) | -0.257* (0.024) |
| **Chile** | -1.068* (0.105) | -0.253* (0.024) | -0.849* (0.088) | -0.186* (0.022) |
| **Venezuela** | -1.227* (0.105) | -0.284* (0.024) | -1.464* (0.095) | -0.339* (0.024) |
| **Religious/recreational participation** | 0.831* (0.082) | 0.189* (0.018) | N/A | N/A |

Definitions: "Programmatic" associations are non-religious and non-recreational associations. "Popular sector" –respondent has not completed high school; "Union" – respondent has participated in a union or work association/guild (*gremio*) at any point in the past; "Land invasion" – respondent obtained current home through land invasion; "Time in current home" – years respondent has lived in current residence; "Religious/recreational participation" – has participated in a religious or recreational association. Other variables are self-explanatory. A constant is estimated but not reported. * significant at the 0.05 level.

We may want to consider here an additional measure: the "breadth" of associational participation, or the number of different kinds of programmatic associations in which respondents report having participated. The mean of this variable is just over one-half (0.57), with a minimum of zero and an empirical maximum of six (out of a theoretically possible eight programmatic associations in the surveys). By itself, this evidence does not strongly support the above-mentioned possible interpretation of spuriousness—that results in the data could be driven by the influence of "joiners." If

joiners drive the relationships between the variables in Table 3.9, we might expect a bimodal distribution, with one hump at zero and another hump at higher numbers (which would reflect the idea that some respondents join a lot of associations while others join none). However, an estimated 64 percent of citizens have not participated in any programmatic associations, 22 percent have participated in only one, while just nine, four, and one percent of respondents have participated in two, three, and four associations, respectively.[47]

Using the breadth of associational participation as the dependent variable, the multivariate results are qualitatively similar as with the incidence of participation in any association (i.e., the dichotomous dependent variable for Table 3.9). Table 3.10 reports results of estimating Poisson regression models; in the left two columns, the dependent variable is the breadth of participation in programmatic associations, while in the right two columns, religious and recreational associations are added. Even controlling for class, some of the variables tapping past collective action and immersion in social networks through religious and recreational participation are robustly associated with the breadth as well as the incidence of associational participation.

In sum, the evidence in this section suggests that associations play an important role in the individual participation in the interest arena. The incidence of associational participation outstrips collective or atomized direct action. While associations are most often viewed as vehicles for helping members and participants organize to solve collective problems by their own means, they are also seen as engaging in state-targeted claim making. However, the incidence of claim making via associations outstrips the

[47] An estimated 0.2 percent of citizens have jointed five associations, while just one respondent has joined six.

incidence of collective direct action in three of the four countries under consideration, the exception being Argentina.

The exception of Argentina, points again to the fact that beyond the commonalities suggested in the analysis of pooled data, country-specific factors appear to matter a lot, perhaps indicating the importance of sociotropic factors or broad differences across countries in the character of the popular sectors. Peru, in particular, stands out in terms of high levels of associationalism. This analysis largely not sought to explain this variation; however, we have been careful to note and control for this cross-national variation where desirable. Some further thoughts are suggested in the concluding chapter, but the current chapter has focused on exploring this cross-national variation with systematic individual-level data, which scholars have lacked in previous analyses.

Finally, the evidence suggests that the class bias in descriptive representation is not less for associational participation than it was for direct action; associations thus do not provide a privileged or off-setting site for popular-sector mobilization and representation. Aside from class, variables tapping organizational experience with collective action and immersion in social networks are important predictors of associational participation. The analysis thus points to the important role of individual resources, both those tied directly to socioeconomic status and those of a more organizational nature, in promoting involvement in the interest regime through associational participation.

**Table 3.10. Breadth of Associational Participation**
(Poisson Regression)

| | Number of programmatic associations | | Number of programmatic religious, and recreational associations | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Estimated coefficient (s.e.) | Estimated marginal effect (s.e.) | Estimated coefficient (s.e.) | Estimated marginal effect (s.e.) |
| **Popular sector** | -0.204* (0.059) | -0.166* (0.046) | -0.148* (0.040) | -0.211* (0.055) |
| **Union** | 0.439* (0.075) | 0.495* (0.107) | 0.986* (0.043) | 2.577* (0.183) |
| **Land invasion** | 0.238* (0.072) | 0.242* (0.078) | 0.197* (0.054) | 0.334* (0.096) |
| **Age** | 0.079* (0.010) | 0.071* (0.011) | 0.024* (0.006) | 0.037* (0.010) |
| **Age squared** | -0.001* (0.000) | -0.001* (0.000) | -0.000* (0.000) | -0.001* (0.000) |
| **Female** | 0.260* (0.056) | 0.206* (0.044) | 0.023 (0.037) | 0.036 (0.056) |
| **Time in current home** | -0.003 (0.002) | -0.003 (0.002) | -0.001 (0.001) | -0.001 (0.002) |
| **Argentina** | -0.663 (0.009) | -0.436* (0.053) | -0.571* (0.052) | -0.667* (0.059) |
| **Chile** | -0.778* (0.073) | -0.486* (0.050) | -0.489* (0.046) | -0.593* (0.058) |
| **Venezuela** | -0.784* (0.079) | -0.488* (0.053) | -0.767* (0.055) | -0.821* (0.060) |
| **Religious/recreational participation** | 0.537* (0.055) | 0.639* (0.070) | N/A | N/A |

Definitions are in Table 3.9. A constant is estimated but not reported. * significant at the 0.05 level.

## GENDER AND PARTICIPATION IN THE INTEREST ARENA

Before concluding, I turn to an issue of substantive and descriptive representation not systematically analyzed thus far in this chapter: the issue of gender. Latin America's large-scale shift from Union-Party Hub to Associational Network may have provided new opportunities as well as challenges for the articulation of issues of concern to women and, more generally, for the mobilization of women in political problem-solving activities of various sorts. In the context of the re-democratization of much of the region during

the 1980's and 1990's, some analysts saw a replacement of a hierarchical, "masculine" model of interest representation with a decentralized, horizontal, and more "feminine" paradigm; according to this view, the reduced salience of traditional parties and male-dominated formal-sector unions gave rise to new opportunities for grassroots organizations, including those with disproportionately female memberships, to fill the gap (Buvinic and Roza 2004: 3).[48] This "feminization" of participation in the interest arena may have also given an especially heightened role to women from the popular sectors. Jaquette (1994: 3), for example, emphasizes that "the mass of women's movements from the mid-1970's to the present has been lower-class urban women (*mujeres populares*) who organized to demand relief from the state, supply the basic services the state could no longer provide, or feed their families collectively when it was no longer possible to do so individually."

Our data give us unique empirical leverage to investigate the role of women in the contemporary interest arena. Several conclusions stand out. First, women do participate more in the interest arena than men, both via associations and through direct action. Simple cross-tabs (not shown) confirm the relationship between gender and participation; in the multivariate regressions reported above, the "female" dummy variable is a positive and statistically-significant predictor of atomized direct action as well as the incidence and breadth of associational participation (Tables 3.5, 3.7, and 3.8). Second, the descriptive bias in favor of female participation is most pronounced for programmatic associations; when we include non-programmatic (religious and recreational) as well as

[48] One could also point to the increasing prominence of formal sector teachers' unions, which tend to have disproportionately female membership if not necessarily leadership; according to Education International (2007), over 70 percent of teachers in Latin America are female, though on average women occupy fewer than 30 percent of leadership posts in teachers' unions.

programmatic associations, we find that men and women do not participate at statistically-distinguishable rates (Tables 3.7 and 3.8). In other words, the disproportionate participation of women in the A-Net appears to be explicitly political in that it is geared towards programmatic problem-solving.[49] Finally, however, despite the greater mobilization of women through programmatic problem-solving, the preponderance of women's participation does not lie in women's associations; just 2.11 percent of respondents, and 3.57 percent of women, had participated in a women's group, making this one of the least common forms of associational participation (Table 3.8). By way of comparison, participation in women's groups is dwarfed by participation in neighborhood, parents', or food associations.

In sum, our evidence is consistent with the idea that women do play a disproportionate role in the contemporary A-Net. The greater participation of women is also especially geared towards programmatic problem-solving. Of course, this greater descriptive representation of women in the interest arena does not guarantee a more effective articulation of "women's" interests; nor is women's participation necessarily geared towards the advancement of a problem-solving agenda framed in terms of women's issues. The evidence does suggest, however, that the disruption of the traditional modes of interest representation associated with the UP-Hub has heightened the relative salience of female participation in the interest arena.

[49] However, note that gender is not a significant predictor of collective direct action (Table 3.6).

## CONCLUSION

Various observers have commented on the importance of associational networks in contemporary Latin America as well as the apparent transformation of other structures of representation, in the wake of market reforms and the decline of robust party-union linkages (e.g., Chalmers et al. 1997). However, we have lacked a systematic, comparative investigation of patterns of individual participation in the interest arena. The present chapter has allowed us to probe different modes of individual problem solving and in particular to compare patterns of direct action with associational participation.

Several assertions can be made. First, the incidence of associationalism is quite high across the four countries studied; Peru, in particular, stands out for its high levels of associational participation. In three out of four countries, associational participation exceeds either atomized or collective direct action as a mode of political problem-solving, suggesting associations play an important role in the interest arena. Citizens choose to participate in associations that they see as particularly active at provisioning, that is, helping members and participants organize to solve problems through their own means. At the same time, individuals do participate in associations that are active in making claims on the state; the fact that collective direct action is more infrequent than associational participation may suggest that associations provide citizens an alternate or substitute means of collective claim-making.

Second, however, direct action constitutes an important dimension of the contemporary interest arena as well. Collective direct action is perceived as particularly effective by those who engage in this kind of problem-solving, relative to atomized direct action -- though interestingly, respondents were more likely to engage in claim making

through atomized than collective means, among the forms that could be engaged in either atomized or collective fashion. Such particularistic contacting tends to take the form of contacting the government directly and, secondarily, contacting parties or engaging in legal processes. Direct collective action is largely confined to protest and petitioning (though in Peru, citizens do contact the state collectively at high rates). Thus, the following general conclusions about direct action find support in the data: (1) direct action is common and viewed as effective by people who engage in it; (2) overall, collective direct action is more common than atomized direct action; and (3) among types of direct action that can take an atomized or collective form, action tends to be atomized.

Perhaps surprisingly given Latin America's reputation for high levels of clientelism, contacting influential intermediaries for purposes of accessing the state is actually quite uncommon (though the relatively small number of respondents who had done so reported that this avenue of problem-solving was highly effective). Like the contacting of political parties, the incidence of this form of intermediated direct action is also far outstripped by several forms of unmediated direct action. Of course, this observation does not necessarily contradict previous analyses that emphasize clientelism's political role: intermediated direct action may play a crucial role in the strategies of parties for linking with certain types of supporters, even if on average a relatively low proportion of citizens contact the state through influential intermediaries. Moreover, the analysis in this chapter also suggests an important role for *dirigentes* or influential leaders in abetting forms of direct action we have conceptualized as unmediated, for instance, participation in protests. Such forms of mobilization by local brokers and influential

leaders may be one important channel through which clientelist politics take effect in contemporary Latin America (see, e.g., Schwarzberg 2008 on the case of Argentina).

It is also important to emphasize that there are large cross-national differences in the incidence of political problem solving. In general, Peru stands out for having the highest participation rates, while Venezuela generally has the lowest; Argentina and Chile are generally positioned in between. The chapter's focus on the individual-level correlates of associational participation and direct action across all four countries should not obscure these basic cross-national differences, which, again, underscore the importance of socio-tropic factors in shaping participation.

The multivariate analyses of associational participation and direct action suggest that consistent with a number of hypotheses, several individual-level variables predict participation, including class and other factors. Class distortion characterizes all forms of action in the interest arena, including protest. Beyond that, measures of personal experience with other forms of collective action, specifically land invasions and union participation, appear to play an important role in influencing whether an individual participates in programmatic associations under the current interest regime. While subject to various interpretations, this evidence is consistent with the idea that resources in the form of collective-action skills play a particularly important role; it may also suggest the importance of networks and social ties, as indicated by the positive relationship between participation in programmatic associations and participation in other type of civil society organizations such as those around religious and recreational matters, (though a related neighborhood measure, time in current residence, does not seem to influence associational participation). It appears that the presence of "joiners"

may not provide the best explanation for the relationship between engagement in other forms of collective action or immersion in social networks and associational participation.

Perhaps one of the most important findings is that representation within the contemporary interest arena does exhibit a class bias. Members of the popular sector are less likely to participate in associations or make direct claims than members of the middle class; this finding is robust to inclusive as well as more restrictive measures of the popular sector. This finding is consistent with classic studies of the United States that have argued that "resources" associated with socio-economic status, such as time, money, or skills, are the chief motors of political participation and, with respect to direct action, consistent with perspectives that emphasize the privileged access of elites and middle classes to the state. Yet in the Latin American context, where associational networks have been viewed as particularly important for representing the popular sectors in the wake of the decline of union-party linkages, the finding that the middle classes are more likely than the popular sectors to participate in associations is striking and, perhaps, discouraging. The evidence suggests that associations, while important vehicles for interest intermediation in Latin America, have some distance to travel before they will close a historical, class-based representational gap.